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Notes from the Editor

We are pleased to announce that The Hilltop Review is now available on an
online journal data-basing system, Scholar Works: http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/
hilltopreview. This allows articles in The Hilltop Review to be included in the results of online search systems such as Google. This data-basing system increases the
profile of both the author’s research and the online presence of The Hilltop Review.
Special thanks are due to Ochas Pupwe of the Graduate Student Advisory Committee
(GSAC) and Maria Bundza of Waldo Library for getting this online system up and
running. Also in the IT sector, both Ochas Pupwe and Raed Salih deserve credit for
streamlining and updating the Hilltop Review’s GSAC website: http://
www.wmich.edu/gsac/publications.html.
As always, the efforts of the chairs and directors of the various fields of academic research and science at WMU are indispensable to the completion of the peerreview process. The chair or director of each author’s home department is contacted
and asked to suggest one faculty member and one graduate student who might serve
as a peer-reviewer. The prompt response and helpful suggestions of the chairs and
directors are gratefully acknowledged.
The completed peer-review forms are forwarded to the authors and each author completes a process of revise and re-submit. The authors are to be congratulated
on their timely completion of this process and for taking advantage of outstanding
feedback and criticism. I couldn’t be more thankful for the hard work of the peerreviewers and quick turnaround with the papers they agreed to review. The members
of the Editorial Board also read and copy-edited one paper each. Their thoughtful
commentary undoubtedly has improved the overall quality of this issue of the Hilltop
Review.
The support and assistance of GSAC members and the folks at the Graduate
College are also gratefully acknowledged. Along with other programs that assist
graduate students at WMU, The Hilltop Review is made possible with funds from the
Graduate Student Assessment Fee.
Over the semester GSAC went through a rather exciting leadership change.
Our former Chair, Joel Ravaleoharimisy, accepted a teaching job at a university here
in Michigan and stepped down as Chair. Our former Vice Chair, Latasha Chaffin was
elected Chair, and our former Support Specialist, Ochas Pupwe, was elected to the
office of Vice Chair. Stepping in to fulfill the role of Support Specialist, Raed Salih,
has been a welcome addition to the GSAC leadership team. So much for the changes
in leadership at GSAC.
In this issue we have seven articles representing a good range of social and
natural science here at WMU. This issue features articles from Political Science,
Counseling Psychology, Public Affairs and Administration, History, Engineering,
Music, and Sociology. For this issue we have also opened the page limit compared
with previous issues. The authors have been able to more fully develop their arguments with the extra space, and the Review has benefited from the change in editorial
policy. Our lead article, “A Rose by any other Name: State Criminality and the Limits of Social Learning Theory,” by Elizabeth Bradshaw, was selected by the Editorial
Board as best paper for this issue. In addition to the honor of being voted best author
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the first prize includes a monetary prize of $500.
The Hilltop Review looks forward to receiving and publishing more papers
and artwork by graduate students at WMU. Moving into the future, there will be
prizes for best papers and artwork for every issue of the Hilltop Review. We hope
this incentive will increase the profile of the Hilltop Review here on campus as well
as encourage more graduate students to consider submitting their work for review.
There are also cash prizes for second and third place. A digital photograph by Elba
Marcell Rivera Rodriguez, titled “Antique Power,” graces the cover of the Hilltop
Review and won a $ 500 prize for best artwork. For the Call for Papers, see the end
of this issue or our website: http://www.wmich.edu/gsac/publications.html

The Hilltop Review, Fall 2011

1

A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME: STATE CRIMINALITY
AND THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY
By Elizabeth A. Bradshaw
Department of Sociology
elizabeth.a.bradshaw@wmich.edu
Over the past thirty years, social learning theory has emerged as one of the top criminological theories of the time. Capitalizing on Edwin Sutherland’s differential association
theory, social learning theory provided the means for a quantitative assessment of Sutherland’s
propositions. Advanced largely by Ronald Akers, the vast majority of research conducted on
social learning theory has been limited to self-report studies of adolescents and college students, largely due to convenience. The limitations of the methods developed to empirically
test social learning theory combined with the difficulty of gaining access to people in positions
of power, has been the primary impediment to testing the theory’s applicability to state and
corporate criminality.
In contrast to social learning theory, Sutherland established the relevance of differential association to studying white-collar crimes early on by examining the law violations of
corporate executives and CEOs. Yet social learning theory has lost this focus on crimes of the
powerful, due in part to methodological restrictions. One suggestion for overcoming this limitation is to begin incorporating qualitative methods and data sources such as autobiographical,
biographical and journalistic accounts to more thoroughly investigate the social learning process involved in state and corporate crimes. If a theory claims to be truly comprehensive, as
Akers claims social learning theory is, then it must prove itself applicable to all populations,
different types of criminal and delinquent behavior as well as more diverse methodologies. If
it cannot, then it must be abandoned in favor of more versatile theories of criminal behavior
which can adequately account for crimes in the street as well as crimes in the suite.
Differential Association Theory
At a time when psychological and biological theories of crime and delinquency dominated the study of criminology, Sutherland introduced the theory of differential association in
the 1939 edition of his popular textbook Criminology. Locating the causes of criminality outside of the individual, differential association maintains that criminality is learned, just as any
other behavior. Securing criminology as the domain of sociology, Sutherland had laid the
groundwork for an exploration of the social factors which contributed to crime.
Laying out the nine principals of differential association which have been left unchanged since the 1947 edition of Criminology, Sutherland states that:
1. Criminal behavior is learned.
2. Criminal behavior is learned in interaction with other persons in a process of
communication.
3. The principal part of learning criminal behavior occurs within intimate personal
groups.
4. When criminal behavior is learned, the learning includes (a) techniques of commit
ting the crime, which are sometimes very complicated, sometimes very simple; (b)
the specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes.
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5. The specific direction of motives and drives is learned from definitions of legal
codes as favorable or unfavorable.
6. A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to vio
lation of law over definitions unfavorable to violations of law.
7. Differential association may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and intensity.
8. The process of learning criminal behavior by association with criminal and an
ticriminal patterns involves all of the mechanisms that are involved in any other
learning.
9. While criminal behavior is an expression of general needs and values, it is not ex
plained by those general needs and values, since noncriminal behavior is an expres
sion of the same needs and values. (Sutherland and Cressey 1978:81-2)
One common criticism of differential association theory is that not everyone who
comes in contact with criminals becomes criminal themselves. Overlooking the key terms
“excess” and “differential,” this contention ignores the dual counteracting forces of definitions
both favorable as well as unfavorable to law violation. Resulting from an overabundance of
definitions favorable towards law violations compared to unfavorable ones, whether one becomes criminal or not depends on the patterns of behavior to which one is exposed
(Sutherland and Cressey 1978).
Other prominent criticisms of differential association theory point to its failure to
adequately define and operationalize “an excess of definitions favorable to law violations over
definitions unfavorable to violations of law.” However, Sutherland and Cressey make clear
that “the same objective definition might be favorable or unfavorable, depending on the relationship between donor and recipient” (1978:90). Furthermore, definitions are not uniformly
weighted. Instead, definitions vary in frequency, duration, priority and intensity dependent
upon when and in what sequence differential associations take place as well as the prestige of
the source of patterning.
A reflection of the positivist orientation of criminology which values quantitative
methodology, the most damaging criticism of differential association theory highlights its inability to determine the ratio of learned behavior patterns with any specificity. The impossible
task of counting definitions favorable and unfavorable to law violation creates a theory which
is ‘virtually unfalsifiable.’ Additionally, other research such as Cressey’s work on embezzlers
found that individuals were often unable to determine the persons or agencies from whom they
learned their definitions from, not to mention the frequency, intensity and duration of the encounters. More generally, differential association theory had been charged with oversimplifying the process by which criminal behavior is learned (Sutherland and Cressey 1978).
Social Learning Theory
Citing Sutherland’s failure to specify the process through which criminal behavior is
learned as the primary impediment to empirical testing of differential association, Burgess and
Akers (1966) apply principles from B.F. Skinner’s behavior theory (otherwise known as Skinnerian, operant conditioning or reinforcement theory) in an effort to remedy this issue. Behavior theory “differs from other learning theories in that it restricts itself to the relations between
observable, measurable behavior and observable, measurable conditions” (footnote 132).
Thus, an integration of behavior theory and differential association provided the means for
empirically testing and measuring how crime is learned.
Most generally, behavior theory argues that operant behavior (the voluntary actions
of the individual) and respondent behavior (involuntary reflex behavior) is shaped by stimuli
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such as rewards, punishments (positive and negative reinforcers), and the schedule of their
distribution. Altering Sutherland’s nine principles of differential association, Burgess and
Akers lay out their own seven propositions:
1. Criminal behavior is learned according to the principles of operant conditioning.
2. Criminal behavior is learned both in nonsocial situations that are reinforcing or
discriminative and through that social interaction in which the behavior of other per
sons is reinforcing or discriminative for criminal behavior.
3. The principle part of the learning of criminal behavior occurs in those groups
which comprise the individual’s major source of reinforcements.
4. The learning of criminal behavior, including specific techniques, attitudes, and
avoidance procedures, is a function of the effective and available reinforcers, and the
existing reinforcement contingencies.
5. The specific class of behaviors which are learned and their frequency of occur
rence are a function of the reinforcers which are effective and available, and the rules
or norms by which these reinforcers are applied.
6. Criminal behavior is a function of norms which are discriminative for criminal
behavior, the learning of which takes place when such behavior is more highly rein
forced than noncriminal behavior.
7. The strength of criminal behavior is a direct function of the amount, frequency,
and probability of its reinforcement. (Burgess and Akers 1966:146)
Perhaps most reminiscent of differential association, the authors make clear that the
learning of criminal behavior occurs in the group which is the individual’s primary source of
reinforcement. Outside of the home, an adolescent’s primary peer group may serve this function. Comparatively, an adult’s primary peer group outside of the family could potentially be
located where the majority of their time is spent; the workplace.
In subsequent revisions of social learning theory, Akers (1977) has included imitation
(the act of engaging in behavior after observing that behavior) as part of learning process as
well. Additionally, the concept of neutralizations was also further developed from Cressey’s
earlier references to “verbalizations,” “rationalizations,” and “vocabularies of adjustment and
motives.” Akers claims that “these techniques function to make the delinquent acts seemed
justified and deflect social and self-disapproval” (1977:52). Thus, an act which at one time
may have been seen as deviant is justified to one’s self and to others as socially acceptable.
A reflection of its parent discipline psychology, behavior theory most easily lends
itself to testing within controlled, experimental environments. As such, most research done on
social learning theory has suffered an over reliance on quantitative methodologies and captive,
controlled populations. Rendering the concepts of behavior theory applicable outside of the
laboratory and into the social world has proved to be an arduous, if not impossible task.
Research on Social Learning Theory
Led by Ronald Akers, social learning theory has persisted as one of the central theories within criminology. Much of the research done on the theory has been limited to drug and
alcohol use, most frequently amongst adolescents and young adults, due to their concentrated,
and largely captive statuses within schools, colleges, and reformatories. The ways in which
social learning variables are operationalized and tested remains fairly predictable and uniform
despite the growing history of the theory. Frequently, differential peer association, definitions
favorable and unfavorable to crime, differential reinforcement and imitation are used as independent variables and paired with a specific deviant or criminal act as the dependent variable
(Akers 1998).
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The manner in which social learning variables have been measured also remains
quite standardized. Take, for example, differential peer association; “typically, it is measured
by number or proportion of friends who are involved in delinquent or deviant behavior, although modalities of association are sometimes measured” (Akers 1998:111). Definitions favorable and unfavorable, on the other hand, are most often gauged by evaluating attitudes,
beliefs and neutralizing definitions towards a deviant or criminal act. Moreover, peer and/or
parental approval or disapproval as well as parental sanctions, rewards and punishments are
frequently used to measure differential reinforcement. Unadventurously, most of the research
on social learning theory has closely followed these measures.
Akers (1998:112) boasts of the strength and the magnitude of the relationships between peer association variables and deviance throughout the literature. He even goes as far
as saying “virtually every study that includes a peer association variable finds it to be significantly and strongly related to delinquency, alcohol and drug use, and abuse, crime, and other
forms of deviant behavior” (116). He further asserts that “other than one’s own prior deviant
behavior, the best single predictor of the onset of continuance or desistance of criminal and
delinquent activity is differential association with conforming or law-violating peers” (116).
“This impact of peer association is found so routinely,” Akers bolsters, “that it is no overstatement to say that it is among the most fully substantiated and replicated findings in criminological research” (116). However, within the research on social learning theory, little has been
done concerning law violations committed by political and economic elites.
Over the years Akers and his colleagues have gathered a great deal of data in order to
test social learning theory. With few notable exceptions, the vast majority of the research
using social learning theory has examined alcohol, smoking, drug use and other delinquency
among adolescents and college students. Moreover, the methodology used to measure social
learning has been limited to surveys and self report data. Due to the difficulties of accessing
people in positions of power, there has been no research which examines social learning as it
relates to law violations committed by political and corporate elites. Within these parameters,
the research on social learning theory has consistently demonstrated the strength of differential peer association (the primary variable measuring differential association theory), while
showing weak support for differential reinforcement (the key variable distinguishing social
learning theory from differential association theory).
The first fully specified model of social learning theory, the Boys Town Study as it
came to be known (since it was funded by the Boys Town Center for the Study of Youth), was
conducted by Akers, Krohn, Lanza-Kaduce, and Radosevich (1979) and would prove to be a
source of data for years to come. Although their initial hope had been to recruit the sample
from incarcerated juveniles, their access had been denied. Instead, the Akers and his team
were left to draw their sample from school districts in Iowa and Wisconsin. Drawing from
seven school districts, Akers et al. received completed questionnaires from 3,065 students in
grades 7-12. The influence of imitation, definitions, differential association, and differential
reinforcement variables on alcohol and marijuana use and abuse was examined (Akers 1998).
Portraying the normative dimension postulated by Sutherland, the study found that peer norm
qualities (proscriptive, prescriptive, permissive, or ambivalent content of its norms) towards
alcohol and marijuana use had a stronger impact than both parental and religious norm qualities. In support of Akers’ claims, differential peer association, including peer norm qualities,
proved to be the strongest predictor of adolescent drug and drinking behavior.
The Iowa Study provided Akers, Lauer, and Krohn with an opportunity to test social
learning theory on adolescent smoking behavior. A longitudinal study of secondary school
students including two junior high schools (grades 7-9) and one senior high school (grades 1012) in Muscatine, Iowa (population 23,000) was conducted. In total, there were 2,194 students who participated the first year, 1,068 students who participated in the study for three
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consecutive years and 454 students who participated for five years (Akers 1998). Using a
similar measurement of differential peer association as the Boys Town Study
three of the modalities of association were measured by asking, ‘How many
of your friends smoke?’ for friends known the longest time (duration),
friends most often together with (frequency), and best friends (intensity).
The response categories were none, less than half, more than half, and all or
almost all. (Akers 1998:213)
Analysis was done using a LISREL model. In the first year sample, differential association variables including association/imitation and differential peer association had the
strongest influence on adolescent smoking. Attempting to account for the influence of smoking in the first year of the study on subsequent smoking behavior, Akers concludes that the
model was likely incorrectly specified in the three year sample. In the fifth year sample, the
strong effect of differential peer association at time three was found.
Assessing the effects of adolescent smoking over a period of time is difficult, however, due to the sporadic and incidental experimentation with smoking for people within this age
range. Even so, Akers (1998:232) contends that
Peer association was found to be the best predictor. In fact, knowing the
smoking behavior of one’s best friends in the first year of the study is about
as good a predictor of one’s smoking behavior in the fourth and fifth years
as knowing one’s own smoking behavior in the first year.
Thus, differential peer association has demonstrated its relevance to adolescent smoking behavior. Additionally, this data was also used by Akers and Lee (1996), whose analysis yielded
similar results.
An exception to the use of adolescents as research subjects, Akers, Cochran and
Sellers (1989) apply social learning theory to alcohol use among the elderly. The sample consisted of persons 65 years and older living in two retirement communities (N=216 and 516)
and two age integrated (N=352 and 326) communities in Florida and New Jersey. However,
the authors do not make clear which communities were located in NJ, though it seems that the
both age-integrated communities were located in FL. Although the samples from the ageintegrated communities were randomly selected, the retirement community samples were not.
If it is in fact the case that both of the retirement communities were also located in NJ, this
further limits the generalizability of the results.
Differential association variables inquired about spouses definitions of alcohol consumption, family norms, friend’s norms, and differential peer association. In contrast to many
of the studies on adolescents, differential reinforcement variables (balance of how drinking
positively or negatively affects one’s social relationships, balance of perceive positive and
negative effects, and perceived costs versus rewards) seemed to be more influential than the
differential association variables. Interestingly, those individuals defined as problem drinkers
are more likely than the average drinker to hold negative views towards heavy drinking (Akers
1998). In conclusion Akers et al. find that “…among adolescents use of alcohol is somewhat
more socially conditioned and tied to peer contexts and reactions than among the elderly, for
whom drinking appears to be sustained more by the effects of the alcohol itself” (1989:634).
Thus, differential peer association and drinking seems to be less significant amongst elderly
populations.
Exploring the relationship between gang membership and delinquency, Winfree,
Mays and Vigil-Backstrom (1994) apply social learning theory to incarcerated delinquents in
New Mexico. Boys ages 12 to 19 who were adjudicated and incarcerated in two institutions as
well as a female institution were included (N=258). However, since the sample size is small
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and only includes incarcerated individuals, the results are not generalizable. The authors
found that “the most important social learning variable is the proportion of one’s best friends
who are members of youth gangs, or peer gang members” (242). Thus, differential peer association was significantly larger than the effects of other variables. Regardless of age, gender
and ethnicity, Winfree et al. find that differential associations and definitions predict individual delinquency.
Durkin, Wolfe, and Clark (2005) apply social learning theory to college students and
binge drinking. Defining binge drinking as consuming five or more drinks in one sitting, the
definition itself seems to include a great deal of variability depending on the context. Their
sample consisted of 1,459 undergraduate students from four different institutions of higher
education (two in the Midwest, one in the Mid-Atlantic region and one in the South). It is not
specified, however, what types of institutions of higher education they include. For example,
30.7% of the sample resided with family members which may indicate that at least one of the
schools is some type of commuter school. The difference in residency could substantially
affect peers influence on drinking depending on the social setting (dorm vs. apartment vs.
parents house vs. bar). The difference in institution types could also be correlated with socioeconomic status. The sample drawn was furthermore not randomly selected, and is thus not
generalizable to the larger population. The authors found that “as predicted, binge drinkers
were more likely than other students to associate with peers who also engage in this behavior.
In fact, differential peer associations were the best predictor of binge drinking in the regression equation” (266). Again, differential peer association seems to stand out amongst the social learning variables.
Attempting to apply social learning theory to a new terrain of criminality, Skinner
and Fream (1997) examine computer crime amongst college students. A multistage sampling
procedure was used to obtain a sample of 581 undergraduate students at a major university in
a southern state in order to access students in majors which would likely be more familiar with
computers. Violations such as using or distributing pirated software, attempting to access
someone else’s password or account, altering someone’s computer information without their
permission or knowledge, or writing or using a program to destroy someone else’s computer
data, were included as measures of computer crime. Skinner and Fream found that
the two main social learning variables in this study, differential association
and definitions, consistently influence all types of reported computer offenses. Differentially associating with peers who participate in computer crimes
is the strongest predictor of piracy and the computer crime index. Definitions associated with adherence to the laws against these acts are significantly and negatively related to all types of computer crime and are the most
important predictor of illegal access to browse. (510)
Once again, differential association with peers emerges as a significant variable. Furthermore,
definitions unfavorable to computer crime law violations (including the law itself) being the
strongest predictor, stresses the importance of recognizing the context in which these definitions are formed.
In “Social Learning and Structural Factors in Adolescent Substance Use” Lee, Akers,
and Borg (2004) address a gap in the literature on the impact of social structure on social
learning. Conceptualizing social structure as “… an arrangement of sets and schedules of
reinforcement contingencies and other behavior variables” (17), the authors continue to neglect many of the more macro/institutional influences on social learning such as political
economy, religion and education. Instead, Lee et al. include socioeconomic status, age, gender, family structure and community size as structural variables. They postulate that social
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learning mediates the relationship between the structural variables and substance use amongst
adolescents. Adding on the structural dimension to the Boys Town study conducted in 1979,
the data is twenty-five years old and the lapse of time between collection and analysis likely
decreases the relevance of the findings. Unfortunately, most of the relationships between the
structural variables and substance use as mediated by social learning variables turned out to
relatively weak. Although Lee et al. continuously claim that their hypotheses are confirmed,
the relationships are quite week and social learning variables do not mediate a substantial portion of the relationship between structural factors and adolescent substance use.
Despite Akers’ claims of success for social learning theory, its application has been
incredibly limited and its findings consistent in only one area: differential peer association.
The core of differential association theory, associations with peers who hold favorable or unfavorable definitions to law violation is consistently the most significant predictor of crime
and deviance out of all of the social learning variables. Ironically, this does not demonstrate
the strength of social learning theory, but rather differential association theory. Differential
reinforcement, which is perhaps the most quintessential concept setting social learning theory
apart from differential association, only occasionally yields significant relationships to crime.
If support is most consistently found for differential association variables rather than the others, then why does Akers’ social learning theory continue to be classified as distinct from
Sutherland’s differential association theory? As long as research evidence continues to show
support for elements of Sutherland’s theory rather than Akers’, then a return to the principles
of differential association is needed.
Social Learning/Differential Association Theory and State Crime
With the exception of his social structure and social learning theory, Akers’ conceptualization of social learning theory has narrowly emphasized the relation of the individual to
the group over the relevance of the group to the individual. Two sides of the same coin,
equivalent attention must be paid to both the micro and the macro forces at work in the social
learning process. While differential association is clearly concerned with the processes by
which an individual comes to participate in crime, it also draws attention to the social context
in which the behavior is learned; an element often neglected in the research on social learning
theory.
It is impossible to examine an individual’s exposure to definitions favorable or unfavorable to law violations without granting attention to the social situation and differential organization in which the patterns take place. Stressing the necessity of analysis at the group
level, Sutherland asserts that
the important general point is that in a multigroup type of social organization, alternative and inconsistent standards of conduct are possessed by various groups, so that an individual who is a member of one group learns to
accept the importance of success, while an individual in another group
learns the importance of success and to achieve it by illegal means.
(1978:94).
Although the individual may be central to Sutherland’s theory, the group context which the
person is exposed to weighs heavily on criminality. Thus, criminality cannot be evaluated
without assessing the individuals’ relationship and interaction with the group.
Demonstrating the significance of social organization, one of Sutherland’s earliest
applications of the theory seems to illustrate its congruency with an organizational analysis of
criminality. Integrating his concept of white-collar crime with differential association, Sutherland’s case study of the seventy largest manufacturing, mining, and mercantile corporations
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demonstrates the applicability of differential association to organizational crime. He maintains that “white collar crime may be defined as a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation” (1983:7). Stressing the need to
study crimes committed by members of the upper socioeconomic class, the concept of whitecollar crime drew attention to the interlocking concepts of power and status which was absent
in criminological theories and research at the time.
It is unclear, however, why social learning theory did not embrace this orientation as
well. Shedding light onto the reluctance of criminologists to follow in Sutherland’s footsteps,
Friedrichs (2000) explains that
In part, this relative lack of attention can be attributed to the challenge of
gaining access to the politically powerful, their ability to conceal many of
their crimes, the complexity and broad scope of the illegalities involved, and
some ideological resistance to regarding government officials as criminal.
(60)
The problem of accessibility is one of the greatest limitations to studying crimes of the powerful. However, these difficulties are further compacted by the methods developed to empirically test social learning theory. The feasibility of administering a self-report questionnaire to a
random sample of corporate executives or government officials involved in criminal activities
is unrealistic. Therefore, social learning theory must move beyond its positivist orientation
and embrace a more qualitative approach.
Interestingly, Akers’ early writings on social learning theory illustrated its potential
for studying white collar and political crimes. Violations of law which aim to alter existing
public policy or power relations are defined as political crime (Minor 1975 in Akers
1977:238). In addition to those who which to alter the status quo from outside the political
system, political crimes “…may also be committed by people in governmental or other official
positions in the attempt to defend the status quo or change the system toward the direction
they want” (Akers 1977:238).
Akers (1977) only began to scratch the surface by conceptualizing the Watergate
scandal during the Nixon administration as a political crime and offering a social learning explanation for it. Citing presidential tape transcripts and congressional testimony as evidence
of an organized conspiracy within the White House, Akers acknowledges the potential for
other types of data in testing social learning theory. By exploring the potential and actual rewards and costs of participation in the Watergate scandal as well as neutralizing definitions,
Akers reconstructs the social context in which the crimes took place. His analysis incorporates structural, organizational and interactional aspects of the scandal, a synthesis absent from
his subsequent research.
An Integrated Analysis
One form of white-collar crime, known as state-corporate crime, is the product of
illegal or socially injurious actions that result from the common pursuits of one or more institutions of political governance in coordination with one or more institutions of economic production and distribution (Michalowski and Kramer 2006: 21). Providing a theoretical framework in which to unite the interactional, organizational and institutional levels of analyses
with catalysts for action (motivation, opportunity and control), Michalowski and Kramer’s
(2006) integrated theoretical model of state-corporate crime is applicable to a wide variety of
white-collar crimes. Recognizing the reciprocal relationship between the interactional, organizational and institutional contexts which influence crime, their model helps to address many of
the deficiencies of social learning and differential association theory by conceptually linking
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the different levels of analysis. As they illustrate,
and actions of the individuals who occupy positions in those units are conditioned by the requirements of the positions they hold and the procedures of
the organization, on the other. Differential association, by focusing on the
social relations that give meaning to individual experience, directs us to examine the symbolic reality derived from social interaction within bounded
organizational niches. (2006:24)
The organizational norms, values and standard operating procedures must be learned by individuals who occupy organizational positions. Learning these definitions is essential to effective organizational socialization and must be adopted, at least tentatively, by individuals who
wish to succeed. Thus, social learning/differential association theory can help to explain organizational socialization by showing how individuals take on the norms and beliefs of the
organization.
After surveying the landscape of state-corporate crime research, Kauzlarich and Matthews (2006) identify a disparity at the interactional level of analysis. Research on state crime,
corporate crime and state-corporate crime has tended to most often focus on the organizational
and institutional levels of analysis, and has overlooked the significance of the interactional
level. Citing the need to design studies for more fully understanding state-corporate crime at
this level, they clarify that
Here we are referring to the ways in which the persons who occupy positions within state and corporate structures conceptualize their relationship to
their work and their organization and how those individuals who are hurt by
state-corporate crime come to grips with their victimization. (243-4)
To achieve this goal, they propose conducting qualitative interviews. Although this methodology might excellently capture the experience of victims of state-corporate crimes, it is not as
well suited to understanding the perpetrators.
An Interactional Analysis of the Bush Administration and the Illegal Invasion and Occupation
of Iraq
A perusal of recent state crime and state-corporate crime research readily reveals a
repeat offender: the Bush administration. In addition to their many other illegal activities
(human rights abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, illegal wiretapping, firing federal
prosecuting attorneys, and creating false pretenses for war, amongst others), the Bush administration has been especially criticized for its criminality concerning the war in Iraq. As
shown by Kramer and Michalowski (2005), the United States’ invasion and occupation of Iraq
broke multiple national and international laws. A crime in progress, the illegal invasion and
occupation was the end product of differential peer association with criminal co-workers. On
a regular basis there continues to be human rights violations (both documented and undocumented) of monumental proportions as a result of the decision to invade Iraq. Although many
of these abuses have been well substantiated within the literature (Kramer and Michalowski
2005; Kramer, Michalowski, and Rothe 2005; Whyte 2007; Welch 2009) as well as within the
mainstream media, little attention has been paid to the process by which Bush administration
officials came to actively or complicity participate in the illegal invasion and occupation of
Iraq. Through a qualitative social learning/differential association analysis of the deviant interactions between members of the Bush administration, a better understanding of the learning
process involved in state criminality will come about.
As noted by Friedrichs (2000), approaching individuals in politically powerful positions about their deviant or criminal behavior is a near impossible task. Just as Akers relied on
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samples of juveniles out of convenience, state crime researchers are forced to rely on secondary sources to provide data. Conducting a qualitative interview or administering a self-report
questionnaire to top officials within the Bush administration is an unlikely possibility. In order to validate any individual level account of differential peer association within the Bush
administration, it is necessary to triangulate multiple sources of data. Drawing on autobiographical, biographical and journalistic accounts of interactions within the administration, it
may be possible to get a sense of the definitions favorable and unfavorable to law violation.
Autobiographical accounts of experiences within the administration are the next best
source to face-to-face interviews. Even though researchers are unable to ask the questions
they want and author bias is a legitimate concern, a myriad of information about personal and
organizational interactions is often revealed from a written first-hand account. For example,
former National Security Council counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke’s autobiography
Against All Enemies provides a scathing critique of his experience within the Bush administration. In other accounts (see also Clarke’s testimony to the 9/11 Commission), Clarke has
made clear that loyalty to the administration is an inherent expectation that comes with any
White House position; hence his book was not published until after his tenure. Additionally,
former Secretary of Treasury Paul O’Neill has also published an account of his experiences
titled The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul
O’Neill in which he argues that the administration was looking for a way to invade Iraq as
early as January 2001. Former CIA director George Tenet also wrote a book titled At the Center of the Storm in which he also suggests that administration officials were searching for a
reason to go to war with Iraq even before September 11 th. Autobiographies such as these can
provide an inside look as to how officials became exposed to an excess of definitions favorable to violating national and international law in order to enter Iraq.
Biographical and journalistic descriptions can also shed light onto the interactions of
Bush administration officials. Providing a detailed account of Bush’s inner circle, Rise of the
Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet allows for a consideration of the long-standing
relationships between many top administration officials. Another account which might help
to explain the influence of Karl Rove on the Bush presidency is Bush’s Brain: How Karl Rove
Made George W. Bush Presidential by James Moore and Wayne Slater. These are only a few
of the many fruitful sources of information on the inner workings of the Bush administration
that can be used to gain a better understanding of the processes by which government officials
come to learn criminal behavior.
Documents from government think tanks and other extra-governmental organizations
could also contribute to a greater understanding of the ideological definitions used to justify
and rationalize policy. The Project for a New American Century (PNAC), for example, is a
neoconservative think tank which has provided support for many of the Bush Administration’s
policies. Believing that American leadership, backed by military predominance, is needed
throughout the world, PNAC aims to secure America’s global hegemonic position for years to
come. PNAC regularly issues briefs, research papers, advocacy journalism, conferences, and
seminars to educate government officials and citizens about their perspectives.
In September 2000, PNAC released a report titled Rebuilding America’s Defenses:
Strategies, Forces and Resources for a New Century. Based off of a Defense Policy Guideline of 1992 authored by then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Rebuilding America’s Defenses reflects many of the ideological beliefs of prominent neoconservative Bush administration officials including I. Louis “Scooter” Libby and Paul Wolfowitz, who were contributing
project participants. Reports such as these can provide a better understanding of the specific
definitions used to justify policy and action towards Iraq.
A more traditional source of data for state crime researchers, government documents
are a tried and true source of information about the interactions of government officials that
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nearly every case study of state criminality relies on. Presidential daily briefings, presidential
signing statements, memos, emails (if they have not been deleted), as well as reports and testimonies from congressional investigations are crucial sources for understanding how officials
come to learn illegal behavior often through seemingly legal practices.
Unexplored territory by researchers interested in state crime is face-to-face interviews
with government officials. Unwilling to cross disciplinary boundaries, many social scientist
have yet to explore this point of access to people in positions of political power. Journalists
regularly interview and interact with government officials, often leading to groundbreaking
stories about government corruption and scandals. If state crime researchers ever hope to be
on the forefront of understanding crimes of the politically powerful then they must adopt journalistic methodologies. Adopting these approaches would also help to expose the public to
definitions of criminality which include the crimes of the powerful. Until then, social scientific knowledge about the interactions and definitions of the political class will be stymied.
By triangulating many of these sources it will be possible to get a contextual sense of
the definitions which were favorable to illegally invading and occupying Iraq. Searching for
converging themes and links between officials might help to reveal the frequency, intensity
and duration of these definitions favorable to law violations. Rather than focusing on the
quantifiable aspects of differential association, a more contextual approach which explains not
only the content of definitions, but the process by which they come to be accepted, is necessary.
Conclusion
Emerging from the difficulties of empirically measuring differential association theory, social learning theory has provided valuable contributions to criminology. Allowing for a
quantifiable evaluation of the principles of differential association, social learning theory has
been most often limitedly applied to convenience samples of adolescents and college students.
If social learning theory is to be regarded as capable of explaining all types of criminal behavior, then its relevance must be tested amongst all populations, for different types of crime and
deviance.
Thus far, social learning theory has been unable to demonstrate its applicability to
crimes of the powerful as well as more traditional crimes. As Akers (1998) makes clear, “This
impact of peer association is found so routinely that it is no overstatement to say that it is
among the most fully substantiated and replicated findings in criminological research” (116).
Much of the research done on social learning theory similarly echoes Akers contention. However, the explanatory power of differential peer association shows immense support for elements of Sutherland’s theory, not Akers’. If factors such as peer association and definitions
reveal significance where reinforcement and imitation do not, then credence must be given to
differential association, not social learning theory. Until more support is demonstrated for
variables unique to social learning theory, a return to differential association theory, and the
methodology it allows for, is needed.
As Kauzlarich and Matthews (2006) note, there has yet to be much research done at
the interactional level of analysis using differential association theory within the hybrid statecorporate crime, as well as within its components state crime and corporate crime. Due to the
difficulty in accessing politically powerful people, second hand sources of data are most easily
obtainable. Triangulating autobiographical, biographical and journalistic accounts from people
in positions of power with documents from governmental and extra-governmental organizations will help to produce a more valid and reliable contextual understanding of the learning
contextual understanding of the learning process involved in state and corporate criminality.
Finally, raising issues of power and control within social science research, the over
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reliance on vulnerable, captive and controlled populations does not show the strength of our
research but rather the limitations of our methods. Moreover, restricting criminological inquires to state defined definitions of law violations facilitate the discipline’s dependence on
the most vulnerable populations in society to gain a better understanding of criminality. If a
theory claims to be truly comprehensive, then it must be able to explain all varieties of crime.
We must therefore move beyond convenience samples of adolescents and college students as
our objects of inquiry and critically examine the applicability of mainstream criminological
theories to all forms of deviance displayed by all populations, regardless of social status.
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In the United States, almost half of all children by age 15 will have lived in a singleparent family (Andersson, 2002). The percentage of single-parent families has tripled in the
past 50 years and has continued to be larger among Latino and African American families
when compared to the general population (US Census, 2010). In 2000, 27% of all U.S. children were living in single-parent families; among African American children, 53% were living with only one parent (Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, 2004). The vast majority of these
single-parent homes are headed by women. DeBell (2008) reported that single-father homes
represent only 7% of the total single-parent homes in the country.
Many authors have documented differences between children raised in father-absent
(FA) and father-present (FP) homes (Balcom 1998; Biller 1970; Chapman, 1977; Daniels,
1986; Downey, 1994; Downey, Ainsworth-Darnell, & Durfur, 1998; Fry & Scher, 1984;
Milne, Rosenthal & Ginsburg, 1986). Research has shown that FA children graduate from
high school and attend college at a lower rate (Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, 2004), perform
worse on standardized tests (Bain, Boersma, & Chapman, 1983), and are more likely to use
drugs (Mandara & Murry, 2006) than children from FP homes. Research has also shown that
growing up without a father seems to have a greater negative effect on boys as compared to
girls (Mandara & Murry; Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, 2004).
A few researchers have focused on resiliency (Hunter & Chandler, 1999; Rutter,
1990) and the strengths of single parent (SP) homes (Amato, 1987; Hanson, 1986; Murry,
Bynumm, Brody, Willert, & Stephens, 2001; Richards & Schmiege, 1993; Shaw, 1991). Hurtes and Allen (2001) created a scale for measuring resiliency in youth and identified commonalities in SP homes where the children achieve academic success. For many years, theorists
have suggested a greater emphasis on strength based research of families of all types (for a
review see Giblin, 1996).
Despite calls for a greater emphasis on discovering strengths, the majority of research concerning single parenthood has focused on the disadvantages faced by children
raised in the absence of their father. However, understanding the disadvantages focuses only
on half of the issue: the other half is to understand the strengths and resiliency factors exhibited by children raised in a FA home. Although children raised in a home where a father is
present graduate from high school and attend college at much higher rates than children raised
in a fatherless home, nearly 70% of children from FA homes do graduate from high school
and 50% of them attend college (Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, 2004). There is a great need
for research focusing on the strengths of these academic achievers from FA homes.
This paper will summarize current research, discuss problems with that body of
work, and suggest areas for further study. Most of the studies reviewed are from the past
twenty years and most are concerned with the academic achievement of children raised in SP
homes. Although there is a large body of research, many studies have been flawed by similar
factors and by the nature of the difficulty in measuring intrapersonal issues. Because there are
flaws, there are many opportunities for further research and areas for growth.
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Relevant Literature
There is a large body of research examining the dynamics of single-parent homes
(for a summary see McLanahan & Sandefur, 1994). Studies relating to the academic achievement of children from single-parent homes are the main focus of this paper. Findings will be
also presented concerning drug use and employment among young African American adults
who were raised in single-parent homes. Two studies regarding adolescent resilience are summarized and a method for measuring youth resiliency is discussed. Finally, two conceptual
frameworks are presented as well as a comparison of single-parent households from 11 countries leading to policy implications and suggestions for further research.
General Trends
Many studies have documented the challenges faced by single parents and the disadvantages of their children relative to children raised in two-parent households. Although some
studies have been inconclusive, a large majority of studies reviewed show that children from
single-parent (SP) homes score lower on tests of cognitive functioning and standardized tests,
receive lower GPAs, and complete fewer years of school when compared to children from two
-parent (TP) homes (Bain, Boersma, & Chapman 1983; Balcom 1998; Biller 1970; Chapman,
1977; Daniels, 1986; Downey, Ainsworth-Darnell, & Durfur, 1998; Fry & Scher, 1984; Mandara & Murray 2006; Milne, Rosenthal, & Ginsburg, 1986; Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan
2004). Even when controlling for economic and racial differences of the family, children
from two-parent households outperform children from one-parent households across a variety
of measures (Downey, 1994; Kim, 2004; Krein & Beller, 1988; Mulkey, Crain, & Harrington,
1992; Teachman, 1987). McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) summarize the research by writing:
Children who grow up in a household with only one biological
parent are worse off, on average, than children who grow up in a
household with both of their biological parents, regardless of the
parents’ race or educational background, regardless of whether the
parents are married when the child is born, and regardless of
whether the resident parent remarries. (p. 1)
Father absence
Early research of single-parent homes focused on “father absence” (FA). The interest in FA homes was due to the large number of single-parent female headed households and
to the influence of psychoanalytic theories that called attention to the importance of the presence of a father in the development of a child’s personality (Hetherington et al., 1983). In a
1970 literature review, Biller reported evidence showing a correlation between FA and juvenile delinquency. He also showed evidence that FA boys have more difficulty forming peer
relationships and long lasting heterosexual relationships as compared to boys raised in a father
present (FP) home. Chapman (1977) reported lower SAT scores among FA males compared
to FP males, and Bain et al. (1983) showed that FA third graders performed significantly
worse in reading achievement and scored lower in a measure of internal locus of control than
FP children. In 1984, Fry and Scher found evidence suggesting poor ego development, low
motivation, and an external locus of control among ten year-old children from FA homes.
Daniels (1986), in her study of young African American men, discovered that the length of
father absence from the home was the strongest predictor of future employment for the young
men. In a more recent study, Mandara and Murray (2006) reported that boys raised in FA
homes were much more likely to use drugs than were boys from FP homes.
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Systems perspective
In the 1980’s researchers began looking at SP households from a systems perspective and tried to determine exactly why children from SP homes were disadvantaged relative
to children from two-parent (TP) homes. Milne et al. (1986) found parental expectations,
number of books in the home, and income to be important predictors of academic achievement of SP children. In 1987, Teachman discovered four important “educational resources
that play a significant role in determining level of schooling for both men and women” (p.
553-554). Downey (1994) built upon Teachman’s study and identified 11 key educationally
related objects – a place to study, a daily newspaper, regular magazine, encyclopedia, atlas,
dictionary, typewriter, computer, more than 50 books, calculator, one’s own room – whose
presence or absence were predictors of children’s future academic achievement. Krein and
Beller (1988) examined differences of the effect of living in a SP home on educational
achievement by gender and length of parent absence. They found that the negative effects of
living in a SP family increase with the total time spent in an SP home, and that the negative
effects are greater for boys than girls. Mulkey et al. (1992) and Kim (2004) both reported that
while family income is important, other factors have a greater influence on academic performance. They suggested that parental expectations, family size, and the quality of the parentchild relationship are stronger predictors of future academic success than income. Implications for future research will be discussed later in this paper.
Boys vs. girls
A number of studies have documented differences between boys and girls raised in
SP homes. In their review, Hetherington et al. (1983) concluded that “the intellectual and
social development of males may be seen as more adversely affected by living in one-parent
homes than that of females from similar family circumstances” (p. 271). Studies published
since Hetherington et al. have reported similar results. Fry and Scher (1984) discovered that
the achievement motivation scores of boys declined significantly over a five year period of
living in a SP home while the scores of girls in similar home environments remained stable.
In 1998, Krein and Beller documented a significant negative effect of the number of years
spent in a SP home on educational attainment for all groups except Caucasian women. According to their findings, Caucasian males spending 18 years in a SP home complete 1.7 fewer years of school as compared to Caucasian males spending 18 years in a TP home. African
American males complete 1.26 fewer years of school, and African American females complete 0.73 fewer years of school when compared to their counterparts living in TP homes.
For Caucasian women, the difference was only 0.03 years. In their recent study of African
American adolescents, Mandara and Murray (2006) found FA to be a significant risk factor
for drug use among boys but not among girls. They reported that African American boys in a
FA home were almost six times more likely to use drugs than African American boys in a FP
home, while the risk factor for African American girls was the same regardless of the number
of parents in the home. Uncovering a reason to explain the greater negative effect of family
disruption on boys compared to girls is a compelling future line of research and will be discussed later.
Resilience and strengths
Research regarding adolescent resilience and strengths of SP families was also reviewed. Basic inquiries into resilience have attempted to answer the question of why some
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individuals from high-risk backgrounds thrive while others fail (for a summary see Rutter,
1990). Researchers have had difficulty defining and measuring resiliency and agreeing on
specific individual characteristics of resilient individuals. In 2001, Hurtes and Allen successfully validated a self-reporting instrument designed to measure resiliency in youth know as the
Resiliency Attitudes and Skills Profile (RASP). They determined that the RASP possessed an
acceptable level of construct validity and could be used to measure resilience as a unique construct. Hurtes and Allen’s suggestion that the RASP needs to be further tested across a variety
of youth subcultures will be discussed later. In addition to resiliency scales, some researchers
have explored the strengths of SP homes (Amato, 1987; Hanson, 1986; Richards & Schmiege,
1993; Shaw, 1991). These researchers have identified strong parent-child communication, a
network of community support, and high levels of adolescent autonomy as strengths of SP
homes. The authors’ suggestions for further research will be discussed later.
Conceptual Ideas
While most research concerning the effects of single parenthood has been quantitative, there have been some qualitative and conceptual ideas presented. Drawing on his clinical
experience, Balcom (1998) stated, “many adult sons abandoned by their fathers have difficulty
developing and sustaining self-esteem, forming lasting emotional attachments, recognizing
their feelings, or being expressive with their adult partners and children” (p. 283). He suggests father-son therapy sessions as a way healing the pain felt by both men. Downey et al.
(1998) compared individualistic versus structuralist perspectives of gender as related to SP
homes. Whereas individualistic theorists view the gender of the parent as necessarily important for the parent-child relationship because of immutable biological sex differences between men and women, structuralists claim that sex roles are not immutable inborn traits but
rather evolve as a result of the different social situations faced by men and women. Downey
et al. argued the structuralist position by showing that men and women behave similarly in the
role of a single parent. Van Laar and Sidanius (2001) used social dominance theory to explain
the poor academic performance of SP children relative to TP children. They suggested that SP
homes have low social status and therefore possess fewer economic resources and face greater
personal and institutional discrimination compared to TP homes. Van Laar and Sidanius also
discussed the tendency of members of low-status groups to behave in ways that are consistent
with and help to confirm negative stereotypes. Similar ideas were presented by Hetherington
et al. (1983) regarding teacher evaluations and the tendency of educators to reward students
for conforming to expectations. Hetherington et al. suggested that when students who are expected to perform poorly actually perform well, they receive negative attention from their
teachers and are pressured to lower their academic performance. Lastly, Pong et al. (2003)
compared the achievement gap between children in SP versus TP homes across 11 countries.
They found that the United States had the largest gap between the academic achievement of
children from SP versus children from TP homes. The authors concluded that national policies have offset the negative outcomes of single parenthood in other countries and that a more
generous United States welfare policy could result in greater equality among all children.
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Research Limitations
Several problems have hindered research regarding single-parent families. Researchers have paid little attention to cultural factors or variations in life experiences and
have instead focused mostly on White, middle-class individuals. Methodological issues,
poor criterion definition, and the presence of confounding variables have flawed certain
studies. Sampling issues have also limited the reliability and representativeness of certain
results. Finally, statistical methods have been questioned in multiple studies and some authors have treated their findings as cause and effect rather than simple correlations between
variables.
The majority of research about SP families has been conducted on White, middleclass families (for exceptions see Murry et al., 2001; or Toth & Xiaohe, 1999). This trend is
disturbing because 52% of SP families are non-White and only 21% are considered middleclass (DeBell, 2008). When researchers have looked at non-White populations they have
tended to focus disproportionately on low-income African American families. Although
well intended, the over focus on low-income African American families leaves Latino,
Asian, and other ethnic minority populations almost completely ignored. A broader sampling of families which more closely represents the true demographics of the United States is
necessary.
Research about SP families has been flawed by methodological issues and a difficulty in defining certain factors. Researchers have often failed to identify the reason for
parental separation. When the reasons have been accounted for, evidence has shown marital
breakdown to be associated with the most negative outcome and parental death to be associated with the least negative outcome (Marsiglio, Amato, Day, & Lamb, 2000). The age of
the child at the time of familial disruption and the length of disruption were often omitted in
many of the studies reviewed. Finally, the presence of other adults in the house, or factors
such as gender, age, and the developmental status of the child were rarely considered.
Sampling and statistical procedures used in many studies have contributed to problems in interpreting and generalizing results. In many studies, participants were selected
based on their attendance at mental health clinics. These individuals may not be representative of the range of single parents because not all single parents seek clinical help. Samples
of SP families taken at different times may distort or misrepresent the data. Another limitation in the existing literature is the overuse of comparing group means. Theorists have become more aware of the variability in SP families and acknowledge that comparisons of
simple statistics such as mean GPA “have yielded little information on the intrafamilial and
extrafamilial conditions that influence the impact of divorce on children” (Hetherington et
al., 1983, p. 209). Finally, Marsiglio et al. (2000) discussed the prevalence and problem of
shared-method variance in many studies of SP households:
Shared-method variance is present whenever researchers use the
same source (fathers, mothers, children, teachers, or observers)
for data on independent and dependent variables. This occurs,
for example, when children report on (a) the amount of time
spent with their fathers and (b) their self-esteem. Under these
circumstances, shared-method variance tends to increase the correlation between variables, resulting in an overestimate of the
true association. (p. 1179)
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Although many researchers have studied SP households, very few have done so in a
scientifically sound manner. Problems with sampling, difficulty isolating variables, and statistical issues have flawed many investigations. Perhaps most damaging to this body of research
is the relative lack of ethnic and racial diversity among the individuals studied. Future proposals should attempt to answer these criticisms.
Suggestions for Future Research
There are several opportunities for future studies to add to the body of knowledge
regarding single-parent homes and the effects of single parenthood on children’s academic
achievement and educational attainment.
Past researchers have discussed the need for more longitudinal studies of disrupted
families. Hetherington et al. (1983) has suggested the possibility that children in SP families
initially suffer but then adjust and adapt over time; this process could only be documented
with longitudinal research. Marsiglio et al. (2000) discussed the importance of realizing how
parenthood may change a person over time and suggested studying the subjective experience
of men as they become fathers. Balcom (1998) believed longitudinal research should be conducted that follows boys from FA homes as they grow into adults and become fathers themselves. Certainly many opportunities exist for more longitudinal research regarding family
disruption and the effects on children.
Another area for further study is determining why single parenthood seems to be associated with greater negative outcomes for boys as compared to girls. Although many researchers have documented differences in academic performance between boys and girls
raised in SP homes, very few have attempted to discover reasons behind the performance discrepancies. McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) presented a theory of male adjustment to divorce that claims that boys express their emotional pain in a more overt way than girls express
emotional pain. They suggest that boys’ reaction to familial disruption most often includes
defiant behavior while the response of girls is marked by depression and mood changes. More
studies are needed which attempt to identify those factors in SP homes that result in poorer
academic achievement among boys as compared to girls.
Very few researchers have looked at strengths and resilience of individuals from SP
families. Richards and Schmiege (1993) and Murry et al. (2001) have called attention to the
fact that despite many disadvantages, SP families often thrive. Hetherington et al. (1983) noted that several studies have reported childhood loss of a father in the family histories of gifted,
extraordinary, and highly creative individuals. Further inquiry is needed to determine if there
is any relationship between familial disruption and the development of creative thought. Lastly, the RASP, designed by Hurtes and Allen (2001) is a tool that has proven to be valid in
measuring resilience among White, middle-class youth. As the authors suggest, the RASP
needs to be further tested with non-White ethnic and racial groups and with non middle class
youth. Further validation of the RASP is an important and tangible line of future research.
Finally, most researchers have investigated White, middle-class individuals and
largely ignored Latinos, Asians, and other ethnic minority groups in the United States. Studies
which have considered African Americans have disproportionately studied lower income families. Greater emphasis must be given to the study of non-White individuals. Concerning
studies of African American SP families, attention must be paid to SP families who are not
low income. As racial and ethnic diversity continues to grown in the United States, the need
to understand all people becomes more important.
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Conclusion
Single parenthood continues to be a reality for many adults and almost 50% of children born today will spend significant time living with only one parent. A large body of research has documented the disadvantages of children raised in single-parent homes relative to
children raised in two-parent homes. Lower high school graduation rates, lower GPAs, and
greater risk for drug abuse are only some of the negative outcomes associated with growing up
in a single-parent home. However, despite the statistics, many children from single-parent
homes do attain academic success. Unfortunately, relatively few researchers have followed
Otto (1963) in researching family strengths. Scholars can help influence public policy by understanding factors which are associated with academic achievement and promote training,
education, and advocacy programs which support single parents and their children.
As a discipline, Counseling Psychology has been among the leaders regarding issues
of diversity and inclusion. Expanding our understanding of single-parent families beyond
White, middle-class populations is crucial if we are to have significant impact on policy and
be able to meet the needs of all people. Furthermore, as more and more gay men and lesbian
women become parents there is a need to expand our research into the dynamics of singleparent families headed by sexual minorities. Counseling Psychology cannot afford to rest on
its past achievements regarding diversity and inclusion, we must continue to expand our thinking and reach out to underserved individuals and families.
In addition to expanding the sphere of research beyond White, middle-class heterosexuals, the field must do more to understand the strengths exhibited by single parents and
their children. Resilience as a basic construct can be much better understood as well as the
parenting skills necessary to foster academic success. My own experience of living in a single
-parent, first-generation US born, female-headed household was one filled with uncertainty at
times regarding finances, my mother’s emotional availability, and the social stigma of not
knowing my biological father. Despite the challenges, my mother successfully completed
college, provided me with key educational resources, and set an academic example to follow.
She planted a belief in me that with preparation, organization, and diligence, academic
achievement is inevitable. Identifying the intuitive skills my mother, and other successful
single parents have, and sharing those best practices with single parents in need can help to
close the academic achievement gap of children from single-parent homes.
This paper has been a review and critique of research from the past few decades regarding single parenthood. While the economic and social costs of single parenthood have
been well documented, the strengths of single parents and their children have been largely
overlooked. Multiple areas for future inquiry have been suggested and it is the hope of this
author that science can influence policy to ensure all children receive equitable resources and
are given the opportunity to thrive.
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TRUST, BUT VERIFY: REAGAN, GORBACHEV, AND THE
INF TREATY
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“Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by miscalculation, or accident, or by
madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us. 1”
- John F. Kennedy
On December 8, 1987, President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty (INF), which aimed to eliminate
short and medium range nuclear weapons from their respective national arsenals. It was a
small but significant step in the long process of easing Cold War tensions between the United
States and the Soviet Union. However, when Reagan first took office in 1981, this outcome
was far from inevitable, and by the end of 1983, relations between the United States and the
Soviet Union were as fragile as they had been since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The
potential for brinksmanship endured well into Reagan’s tenure, despite previous efforts at
détente by both governments. The great success of Reagan and Gorbachev was their agreement in Geneva, Switzerland in 1985 to put aside all other policy issues and agree that, since
it cannot be won, nuclear war must never be fought. This may see to be an obvious conclusion, but to put such an agreement into practice required eliminating the means of deterrence.
This paper is a discussion of the relationship between the deployment of two types of
intermediate (medium) range missile systems in Europe, how leaders on both sides viewed
the situation, and how the potential use of such weapons affected superpower relations during
the last decade of the Cold War. These events led to the signing of the INF Treaty. I argue
that the INF Treaty represents an agreement that the prospect of intercontinental annihilation
trumps the reality of regional provocation. There is no need for short or medium range nuclear weapons when mutually assured destruction (MAD) is the foundation of a global nuclear
peace. As a result, both leaders agreed to a verification schedule backed up by the potential
for unilateral nuclear action if the treaty was violated. By eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons, and significantly reducing the total number in existence, Reagan and Gorbachev
decreased the likelihood of a nuclear domino effect exchange whereby a tactical or mediumrange attack might lead to full-scale retaliation. In a modern retelling of the old paradox, to
secure lawful enforcement of the INF Treaty, which aimed at preventing war, both nations
reserved the right of mutually assured destruction.
The most recent Cold War scholarship tends to portray the positive personal relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev as key to building trust and understanding between the
US and Soviet governments. Gorbachev is further singled out for his role in the partnership
for two reasons. The first reason is chronological. Gorbachev was the last leader of the Soviet Union, and his time in office began after Reagan had already been elected for the second
time. By this reasoning, Gorbachev is the difference maker because change happened on his
watch. Similar arguments have been made about Reagan, too. This line of thinking is based
on the idea that Reagan and Gorbachev were simply in office at the culmination of decades’
1 John F. Kennedy, Address to the United Nations General Assembly September 25, 1961,
American Rhetoric Online Speech Bank, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/
jfkunitednations.htm (accessed January 27, 2011).
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worth of policies on both sides, the totality of which initiated a shockingly abrupt end to the
Cold War under Gorbachev, and the break-up of the former Soviet empire less three years
after Reagan’s successor George H. W. Bush took office.2
The second reason Gorbachev’s contribution is emphasized is more complicated to
isolate, but is more or less a result of Gorbachev’s personality, his intellect, and an openness to
change. In describing the atmosphere just after the Geneva Summit, preeminent Cold War
historian John Lewis Gaddis wrote:
Two years earlier [Yuri] Andropov had thought Reagan capable of launching a surprise attack. Now Gorbachev felt confident that the United States
would never do this. Reagan’s position had not changed: he had always
asked Soviet leaders to ‘trust me.’ After meeting Reagan, Gorbachev began
to do so.” 3
By arguing that Reagan “had not changed,” Gaddis implicitly makes the case that
Gorbachev was the only one of the two who could break the deadlock of mutual antagonism.
On Gorbachev as an individual, Gaddis wrote, “He chose love over fear, violating Machiavelli’s advice for princes and thereby ensuring that he ceased to be one. It made little sense in
traditional geopolitical terms. But it did make him the most deserving recipient ever of the
Nobel Peace Prize.”4
Historian Melvyn P. Leffler also portrays Gorbachev as the central figure, highlighting his intellect and internationalism. During the 1970s Gorbachev worked for the Communist Party on improving the Soviet agricultural infrastructure, which allowed him the rare
freedom to travel outside the country, and, in particular, to the West. Gorbachev, Leffler explains, “Liked talking to foreigners, exchanging ideas, and making comparisons between his
way of life and theirs. He felt pride in the Soviet educational system. He believed his countrymen had better access to medical care and superior public transport system. But his travels
abroad bred doubt.”5 Leffler describes Gorbachev as “extremely personable and engaging, but
he was also tough and intelligent.” His intellect allowed him to “recognize from the outset,
that his domestic goals could not be achieved without readjusting Soviet foreign policy.” 6
In this observation, Leffler and Gaddis are in agreement. Gaddis argues that Gorbachev’s
open mindedness freed him to “[sweep] away communism’s emphasis on the class struggle,
its insistence on the inevitability of a world proletarian revolution, and hence its claims of historical infallibility.” 7 Gorbachev’s curiosity did not go unnoticed by Western leaders.
2 Historians Melvyn P. Leffler and John Lewis Gaddis discuss the importance of Gorbachev
as an individual within the Soviet system based on his unique combination of intelligence and
opportunity. Leffler and Gaddis each note that Gorbachev’s access to education, and foreign
travel in particular, allowed him to make comparisons between life in the Soviet Union and
life abroad. The observations Gorbachev made when traveling spurred his openness to
change in an effort to raise the standard of living within the Soviet Union. After having seen
three consecutive Soviet leaders die in office, Ronald Reagan finally found an enthusiastic
negotiating partner in Gorbachev. Both Leffler and Gaddis argue that the two men truly liked
one another. See: John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin
Press, 2005) and Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, The Soviet
Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007).
3 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 231.
4 Gaddis, The Cold War, 257.
5 Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, The Soviet Union, and the
Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 370.
6 Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 381 and 376.
7 Gaddis, The Cold War, 197.
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After meeting Gorbachev in 1984, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher famously observed, “This is a man with whom I could do business.”8
Gaddis and Leffler are representative of revisionist Cold War historians who have
made the leap to post-revisionism. The opening of Eastern European archives, in addition to a
running stream of memoirs, and the release of Soviet internal documents for public consumption, has infused a tangible sense of excitement to recent Cold War research. Today’s scholars
have much greater access to information than ever before. Combined with a new emphasis on
globalization in writing American History, that access has fed a growing number of Cold War
reexaminations.
Historian Jeremi Suri has also written about the end of the Cold War. In a 2002 article, Suri explained the end of the Cold War by borrowing a concentric circle analogy from
James Joll. In his description, Suri noted that Reagan was, “the man largely responsible for
the crisis atmosphere” of 1983, but that after a series of tense events throughout the year,
“Reagan made a decisive turn toward improved Soviet-American relations.”9 Like Gaddis and
Leffler, however, Suri also holds a special place for Gorbachev, arguing that:
Gorbachev understood that his hopes for improving the Soviet economy and
the quality of domestic life in general required a peaceful international context. Continued Cold War competition would perpetuate that social stagnation he wanted to eliminate. Only extensive and unprecedented East-West
cooperation could permit the allocation of resources necessary for domestic
restructuring (perestroika).10
Suri framed the relationship as one between two individuals who want the same thing, but
approach it from two different directions. Reagan is the paranoid ideologue always searching
for peace through strength, while Gorbachev is the pragmatist, willing to expend political capital in order to bring about change.
What all of these historians have in common is the belief that Reagan and Gorbachev
were both men of their time and circumstance. They were both moral and rational, and they
sincerely liked one another. The absence of pretension in combination with an open style of
dialogue helped foster an honest rapport between the two, which in turn helped thaw Cold
War tension from the top down. Their meeting, however, was far from inevitable, and the
path leading to the INF signing date in December 1987 was fraught with near misses and real
tragedy. From Reagan’s point of view, the Soviet SS-20 deployment during the late 1970s
was a clear attempt to tip the balance of power in Europe away from the West. Once in office,
he worked to respond multilaterally through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
by supporting a plan to match the Soviet nuclear threat.
First Mover Advantage
Proper balance is the key to enduring power relationships. For Europe in the early
years of the Cold War, balance was maintained by measuring the overwhelming number of
conventional Soviet forces against the American “nuclear umbrella” which protected NATO
allies. That is, if leaders in the Kremlin decided to challenge the status quo by advancing militarily against Western Europe, American and NATO leaders could retaliate with nuclear
weapons to offset their numerical disadvantage versus the oncoming force. However, this
balance was based upon the idea that the Soviet military would be the aggressor. From Moscow’s point of view, NATO leaders’ first strike option was always nuclear, which meant a
Soviet conventional force advantage was only as good as an enemy’s reluctance to use nuclear
8 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 463.
9 Jeremi Suri, “Explaining the End of the Cold War: A New Historical Consensus?,” Journal
of Cold War Studies Vol 4 No 4 (Fall 2002): 60-92.
10 Suri, Explaining, 78.
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weapons.
As weapons technology improved during the Cold War, this conceptual balance itself
was shaken by the introduction of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Since it was no
longer necessary to be anywhere near a target in order to hit it, conventional forces were no
longer a first-strike option when the expected retaliation is overwhelming missile retaliation.
Under the threat of intercontinental MAD, the number of divisions the Soviets had in the European theatre was irrelevant, since ICBMs could be used as the great equalizer of the 20 th century. The debate over what constituted “balance” and “security” in Europe, and whether or not
the two were linked, was an ongoing one throughout the Cold War. One group of historians
put is this way:
Thirty years of successful containment in Europe had never resolved the
perennially divisive military dilemmas inherent in the [NATO] alliance. The
heavy reliance on nuclear weapons, as the only effective and affordable deterrent and guarantee of peace, placed Europe completely under the decision
-making power of the United States. Washington alone would determine
how Europe would be defended during any hostilities. 11
The limited technology of jet bombers and artillery helped secure the initial NATO view of the
balance, but considering the accelerated rate of research and development in the post-World
War II world, it could never last.
The steadily increasing total number of nuclear weapons led to another serious Cold
War concern: anti-ballistic missile technology (ABM). The desire to possess a reliable ABM
system is directly related to the size of an enemy’s nuclear arsenal. If one side believed it
could eliminate the other’s ability to counter attack by launching a first strike, then it would be
rational to strike first. It is the ability to retaliate which maintains balance. If one nation began developing the ability to defend against a first strike, it would be in the best interest of a
belligerent nation to launch an attack before the defense system was operational. Otherwise,
once the defender’s shield is in place, they could strike with impunity. This is the logic behind
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 banning such technology, signed by Richard Nixon
and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev. The ABM treaty represents the spirit of détente, a lessening of tension between the superpowers. The US interpretation of détente was overtly shattered during the Jimmy Carter-Leonid Brezhnev years by Soviet interventionism in the Third
World, and by the time Reagan took office in January 1981, there were proxy wars in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Angola.
In Europe during the détente period, Soviet leaders chose to deploy a new kind of
missile, the SS-20. Its capabilities were astonishing: the SS-20 had a target range of three
thousand miles, carried multiple nuclear warheads, and was capable of being launched from
highly mobile platforms. The SS-20 deployment was a strategic move, a threat, that if either
the US or any of its NATO allies attacked the Soviet Union or any of its Warsaw Pact allies,
massive retaliation could be a reality for any or all of them, some within just a few minutes. In
order to make their threat credible, the Soviet government made sure that the deployment was
observable. There is no benefit to developing weapons of deterrence if the enemy you hope to
deter cannot confirm the danger. The threat was then backed up by a promise that the SS-20s
were defensive in nature, but would be launched in retaliation of a nuclear first strike against
the Soviet Union or any of the Warsaw Pact nations. The promise of retaliation is a promise to
do something that a rational or moral leader would not normally do: participate in nuclear war.
11 Norman A. Graebner, Richard Dean Burns, and Joseph M. Siracusa, Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev: Revisiting the End of the Cold War (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International,
2008), 23.
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The promise to use SS-20s was an observable, credible threat to regional security in
Europe, and the world. In deploying the SS-20, the Soviet government shifted the balance. In
1981, former National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy wrote:
Experts have been found to doubt the comfort for Europe in each successive
American doctrine, whether of massive retaliation, or flexible response, or
the seamless NATO Triad. And Soviet threats of all sorts, political and military, conventional and nuclear, actual and hypothetical, have intermittently
strained the balance. It endures.12
By November 1987, Moscow had deployed 470 medium range missiles, capable of striking
from North Africa to Scandinavia, from either side of the Ural Mountains. 13
Independent of the Soviet development of the SS-20, American military contractors
designed a nearly equivalent missile system: the Pershing II. The history of the Pershing II
research and development dates back to 1974, but the real import of the system was not relevant until 1979 when NATO approved basing of the Pershing IIs in West Germany in response to the SS-20 threat. However, two years passed before the program entered the production phase. By that time the Soviet military was integrating two new SS-20s per week into
their arsenal.14
When viewed from the Soviet perspective, the Pershing II system was just as unsettling as the SS-20 system was to NATO allies. The Pershing II is also a ground-mobile, surface to surface, nuclear weapon system, but has a range of only one thousand miles. By deploying the Pershing IIs in West Germany, the target zone included every Warsaw Pact nation, as well as the highest concentration of Soviet civilians (west of the Urals), and Moscow
itself. Former Secretary of State Alexander Haig recalled that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko, “made the expected point that the SS-20s and other Soviet nuclear systems targeted
on Europe did not threaten US territory, but the Pershing II would be within range of major
Soviet cities.”15 This situation is similar to putting the American eastern seaboard within range
of Soviet nuclear forces which Washington argued was unacceptable during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Because of the uneven research and development timelines of the two missile systems, the actual deployment of the Pershing II can be viewed, by logic of chronology, as a
reaction to the deployment of the SS-20s, but this deployment was not guaranteed.

12 McGeorge Bundy, “Strategic Deterrence Thirty Years Later: What Has Changed?,” in The
Future Of Strategic Deterrence, ed. Christopher Bertram, (Hamden, CT: Archon Books,
1981), 10.
13 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the
Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on
the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, December 8, 1987,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/inf/text/inf3.htm (accessed December 14, 2010). This document includes information on the total number, and the maximum range, of both American
and Soviet missiles, including the SS-20 and Pershing II. The geographic range mentioned in
this paper simply fits the listed range capabilities.
14 Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: MacMillan,
1984), 225. Considering this statistic comes from a former US Secretary of State, it should be
read with some caution. However, the Memorandum of Understanding which accompanies
the INF Treaty confirms that a rate of two deployments per week, starting in the late 1970s,
could add up to the total of 470 by November 1987 outlined therein.
15 Haig, Caveat, 231.
The Hilltop Review, Fall 2011

27

William D . William

There are, of course, at least two ways to react to any sequential move situation: action or inaction. Since the research and development of the two missile systems was independent, their
existence alone cannot be considered as a reaction to the other. In military terms, Washington
wanted the option of peaceful destruction of the SS-20s as a military threat. In political terms,
by arguing for the elimination of the SS-20s, Washington was asking Moscow to retract its
retaliatory promise implicit in the threat, which would return the balance in Europe back to the
pre-détente status quo. In order to achieve that end, Washington had the choice to respond to
the SS-20 deployment by either basing Pershing IIs in Western Europe (action, or hard line
approach), or relying on the existing countermeasures already in place (inaction, soft line approach) and negotiate the elimination of the SS-20s from the existing position. The debate
over how to return to the NATO preferred definition of balance in Europe split Reagan’s cabinet.
Soft Line vs. Hard Line
The soft line approach to removal of the SS-20 threat was called the Zero Option.
The debate over the Zero Option effectively pitted Secretary of State Alexander Haig against
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. In his memoir, Haig wrote that:
The fatal flaw in the Zero Option as a basis for negotiations was that it was
not negotiable. It was absurd to expect the Soviets to dismantle an existing
force of 1,100 warheads, which they had already put into the field at the cost
of billions of rubles, in exchange for a promise from the United States not to
deploy a missile force that we had not yet begun to build and that had
aroused such violent controversy in Western Europe. Caspar Weinberger, in
his enthusiasm for the Zero Option, could not concede this point. 16
Haig suggested an aggressive response to the SS-20s as quickly as possible. If the US government were able to counter with deployment of the Pershing II system in a short period of time,
then the Soviet government would be forced to react in kind, continuing the cycle of the existing arms race. By emphasizing the financial cost of SS-20 deployment over the danger it represented as a weapon, Haig shows that he was willing to accept the status quo MAD in order to
fight the Soviets economically. He felt that Moscow could no longer match the US in financing the Cold War arms race, and this was a clear opportunity to attack the irrationality of their
economic system, rather than the rationality of their leaders. Haig felt that the only way the
Soviets would not cheat a verification treaty was if the US had a comparable threat to the SS20 in the field.17
Early in the debate, Weinberger clearly saw the situation differently. Like Haig, he
never doubted that the Kremlin would need some sort of incentive to destroy its SS-20s, but
Weinberger felt that the mere existence of a comparable missile system would be enough, and
that actual deployment would be unnecessary. However, Weinberger’s position was contingent on two points. He writes:
By the first of the two, the Soviets would not only remove the SS-20s, but
would actually destroy them. That was important because the SS-20s were
mobile. The other essential, I felt, to any treaty on any subject with the Soviet Union, was through on-site verification. Meanwhile, I did not feel we
should stop our work on the Pershing IIs or the cruise missiles. I felt that
there would be no possibility of the Soviets agreeing to take out their SS20s, unless, and until, they had the kind of inducement that deployment of
16 Haig, Caveat, 229.
17 Haig, Caveat, 229.
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the Pershing IIs would bring.18
Weinberger felt that existing systems were enough deterrence in the field, but wanted to prepare for, rather than commit to, future missile deployment. He had faith that submarine-based
missiles, F-111 bombers, and Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile systems (ICBMs) would be
enough incentive for Moscow to back down from this particular engagement, provided that
Washington continued moving forward with the research and development of the Pershing
II.19
Haig warned Reagan that the Zero Option, “was a mistake that he would have to
modify within the year.”20 Weinberger was pleased that Reagan at first favored the Zero Option, but later recalled, “Haig need not have feared, because to the President’s disappointment
and mine, the immediate reaction was almost all negative.”21
If the Zero Option best represents the soft line approach, then the NATO Dual Track
policy best represents the hard line point of view, with a caveat. The Dual Track was an attempt to combine both military (hard line) and political (soft line) policies. Track one was a
direct deployment response to the SS-20. In December 1979, as noted above, NATO leaders
approved the basing of Pershing II missiles in West Germany, and ground launched cruise
missiles (GLCMs) in the Netherlands, Belgium, England, and Italy. In December 1981, the
Pershing II program entered the production phase, and by June 1984, deployment of the first
Pershing II battalion was complete.
Track two was an accompanying policy to Track one. Throughout the latter process
Western leaders maintained an open position on negotiating the elimination of SS-20s with
leaders from the Kremlin. By leaving the Soft Line approach open, both Reagan administration and NATO officials could claim to be advocates of pragmatic arms control at the least,
and benevolent arms reduction at the best. If successful, the Two Track policy would achieve
the NATO definition of balance either way. From the Soviet point of view, this was an aggressive move which put Moscow at risk of total destruction within ten minutes of a launch.
The Public Sphere
The Dual Track policy ostensibly showed that leaders in both Washington and
NATO saw no change in the overall precarious nature of Cold War deterrence. The ultimate
deterrence was the ability to retaliate against any first strike, whether it occurred in Europe or
elsewhere. However, this position was terrifying to many Europeans, as well as people who
held philosophical disagreements with the existence of nuclear weapons altogether. The only
way to test if Washington would sacrifice New York for Paris is for Paris to be destroyed first
– every time.
Since both Soviet and American governments made threats of full scale retaliation if
an ally were attacked, MAD had to be considered a credible threat because of the cost of testing an opponent’s resolve. This line of thinking put an extraordinary amount of pressure on
the US government to back up its allies with independent deterrents. If Western Europe was a
target, then NATO allies needed to be able to strike back independently of the US, hence the
necessity of NATO countries having Pershing II missiles and GLCMs on site. The question
of whether or not American leaders were willing to risk New York to defend Paris could be
eliminated by giving NATO leaders the ability to retaliate on their own. Failure by NATO to
retaliate, or the incapability of retaliation, could still be overridden by the potential of Wash18 Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York:
Warner Books, 1990), 337.
19 Weinberger, Fighting, 340.
20 Haig, Caveat, 229.
21 Weinberger, Fighting, 341. Italics in the original.
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ington to strike on their behalf with ICBMs. The basing of Pershing II missiles in Western
Europe merely reset the regional balance of terror.
Palpable concerns over the use of nuclear weapons drove many people to demonstrate against their very existence. By 1982 people were marching by the thousands in Chicago, and hundreds of thousands in New York. The Catholic Bishops of America spoke out
against the arms race as immoral. And by the end of 1982, the anti-nuclear movement was
active in forty-three states.22 Europeans were just as concerned, if not more so, considering
first strike possibilities. In just one month, the number of protesters in Bonn, London, and
Paris numbered over half a million people.23
A visual representation of the nuclear freeze movement was published in newspapers
across the US in July 1985. The image shows a small, single missile silhouette representing
all the bombs dropped in WWII contrasted against 6,667 tiny silhouettes representing the current collective nuclear arsenal of the world. The accompanying text included sobering statistics about the potential destructive power of the US and Soviet arsenals, encouraged people to
contact both President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev in support of upcoming summit talks,
and asked, “How long can we live with the arms race?”24
If Reagan’s hard line approach to the Cold War was terrifying to the people
in the freeze movement, it was reassuring to people who believed in his concept of a position of strength. In a letter to the President in 1984, Charls
Walker of the private interest group Committee on the Present Danger expressed his support for Reagan and his policies:
As you have long recognized, bad arms control agreements are worse than
none at all. Equitable arms control agreements could play a part in insuring
U.S. security – but whether the Soviets are prepared to enter into equitable
agreements is subject to doubt. Today, with the military balance precariously tipped against us, America’s security is directly dependent on growing
strength in our defense forces. 25
The idea that “bad arms control agreements are worse than none at all” was shared by many,
but this concept holds inherent logical fallacies. This idea is a moralistic one, in which the US
only participates in the arms race in a reactive way, rather than as the first cause. If there is a
legally binding treaty, then both parties must answer to the letter of the law. But in the absence of a treaty, value judgments rule the day, feeding the nuclear hysteria rather than fostering peaceful negotiation.
Many Congressmen, both Republicans and Democrats, recognized this problem, and
encouraged Reagan to make the necessary efforts to find common ground with Soviet leaders.
Republican Senator Larry Pressler wrote to Reagan, pleading, “we owe it to the world” to negotiate, and that suspended talks “would not be in the interest of any nation.” 26 Shortly thereafter, a group of Democratic House Representatives encouraged Reagan to be less confrontational, and more diplomatic. They argued that it was, “in the interest of all mankind that serious bilateral negotiations be resumed.”27
22 Graebner, et al, Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev, 32.
23 Graebner, et al, Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev, 33.
24 Letter, Joan B. Kroc to Ronald Reagan, July 12, 1985, WHORM: F006 03, Ronald Reagan
Library.
25 Letter, Charls E. Walker to Ronald Reagan, January 11, 1984, WHORM: F006 03, Ronald
Reagan Library.
26 Letter, Larry Pressler to Ronald Reagan, November 25, 1983, WHORM: F006 03, Ronald
Reagan Library.
27 Letter, Bill Green to Ronald Reagan, February 10, 1984, WHORM: F006 03, Ronald
Reagan Library.
The Hilltop Review, Fall 2011

Trust, but Verify

30

A group of Republican Senators led by Malcolm Wallop and Jesse Helms co-signed
a letter to Reagan regarding the administration’s policy of recognizing the parameters of the
un-ratified SALT II treaty. They asked, “Shall you continue to abide unilaterally by treaties
and agreements that the Soviets have violated and that have expired anyhow? Unilateral compliance is unilateral disarmament.” These Senators argued for the negative, and they rejected
the tit-for-tat strategy of matching Soviet treaty infractions. Wallop, Helms, and the others
agreed, “that option would give the Soviet Union control over what we do and don’t do, and,
above all, keep our defense planning within a framework that is fundamentally wrong.” 28
Reagan, of course, agreed that a world free of nuclear weapons would be a world
much improved. Yet the reality was that no one, no matter how much power they wielded,
had the ability to simply call for the destruction of a nuclear arsenal. There were too many
overlapping interests involved, and always the balance of power to consider.
This point is perhaps best summed up by former diplomat Miles Copeland in his
seminal work, The Game of Nations. He writes, “when vital national interests are at stake,
and when it is a question of seeing them endangered or bowing to some high moral principle,
there is no question but that it is the high moral principle which will suffer.” 29 The endangered
high moral principle in this case is that the mere existence of nuclear weapons is immoral.
The paradox is that if just one belligerent nation possesses nuclear weapons, it is immoral not
to possess them for your own nation. This paradox of politics and morals is as old as time. In
trying to serve the best interest of a nation in a world in which some other leaders behave immorally, behaving morally may put you at a disadvantage, and therefore threatens the best
interest of your nation. Those who would behave immorally can manipulate predictable moral
behavior. Reagan confirmed as much in his State of the Union address in 1985, stating, “We
cannot play innocents abroad in a world that’s not innocent.” 30When it comes to the nuclear
arms race, behaving morally is immoral when you are in a position of power, unless and until
another nation has the capability of MAD, at which point morality once again takes over.
This kind of theoretical wordplay is difficult to impart to the masses when the consequences
of miscalculation could mean the end of civilization as they know it. Fear is much easier to
convey than reason. In looking across the oceans at one another, both nations saw danger.
The Mirror Image
The years between Reagan’s first election and the ascendancy of Gorbachev to General Secretary were some of the darkest days of the Cold War. The atmosphere led many people to believe that escalation was the only constant, and that the cruel teleological path of a
nuclear arms race could only lead on one horrifying conclusion. Reflecting on the tension in
early 1980s, Gorbachev wrote, “This was a time when many people in the military and among
the political establishment regarded a war involving weapons of mass destruction as conceivable and even acceptable, and were developing various scenarios of nuclear escalation.” 31In his
memoirs, Reagan recalled that, “I carried a small plastic-coated card with me, [which] listed
the codes I would issue to the Pentagon confirming that it was actually the president of the
United States who was ordering the unleashing of our nuclear weapons. The decision to
28 Letter, Malcolm Wallop to Ronald Reagan, June 4, 1985, WHORM: F006 03, Ronald
Reagan Library.
29 Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York: College Notes & Texts, Inc, 1969), 28.
30 Ronald Reagan, Public Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1985
Volume I (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), 135.
31 Mikhail Gorbachev, “The Nuclear Threat”, in Implications of the Reykjavik Summit on Its
Twentieth Anniversary, ed Sydney D. Drell and George P. Schultz (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 2007), 9.
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launch the weapons was mine alone to make.”32
Assume for a moment that Reagan’s statement about being solely responsible for
ordering a nuclear strike is true, and that everyone from the top down would follow such an
order. If the Soviets withdrew their SS-20s without some combination of threat or concession
from Washington, they would appear weak, and lose credibility in their reputation as hardliners. In the absence of economic power, political will backed by military reputation is the
strongest feature of any government, and therefore indispensable. Whatever the NATO response would be to the SS-20 deployment, short of nuclear war, Moscow could not blink. To
do so would indicate less-than-total faith in the choice to deploy the SS-20s. In the resulting
geo-political atmosphere, every situation involving either the US or Soviet Union was highly
scrutinized and presented as proof of the others’ aggression or intransigence.
In the collaborative effort The Sword and the Shield, historian Christopher Andrew describes
the Soviet position early in the Reagan administration. Andrew writes, “In a secret speech to
a major KGB conference in May 1981, a visibly ailing Brezhnev denounced Reagan’s policies
as a serious threat to world peace.”33 At the same conference, KGB Director Yuri Andropov
announced operation RYAN (Raketno Yadernoye Napadenie, “Nuclear Missile Attack”).
Andrew continues, “RYAN’s purpose was to collect intelligence on the presumed, but nonexistent, plans of the Reagan administration to launch a nuclear first strike against the Soviet
Union – a delusion which reflected both the KGB’s continuing failure to penetrate the policymaking of the Main Adversary and its recurrent tendency towards conspiracy theory.” 34
By 1983, Brezhnev had passed away and Andropov was the new General Secretary.
Unfortunately, Andropov’s health upon entering office was not much of an improvement over
Brezhnev’s later years, and the paranoid view of Washington continued unabated. In describing Andropov and the political climate of 1983, historian Vladislov Zubok writes, “On September 29, Pravda published his ‘farewell address’ on Soviet-American relations. Andropov
informed the Soviet people that the Reagan administration was set upon a dangerous course
‘to ensure a dominating position in the world for the United States of America.’” 35 Previous to
his duties as General Secretary, Andropov had been the longest serving head of the KGB, and
he was well aware of the American government’s geopolitical strategy and capability. Based
on American actions, not words, Andropov made a good point.
For his part, Reagan was all too happy to play the insult game, and consistently derided the Soviet Union in public. In a speech to the British House of Commons, Reagan
warned that, “the march of freedom and democracy…will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash
-heap of history.” 36 In his first term, Reagan famously labeled the Soviet Union an “evil empire” and warned people not to “remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong
and good and evil.” 37George Kennan, the father of US containment policy called Reagan’s
views toward the Soviet Union “intellectual primitivism.”38
32 Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 257.
33 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 213.
34 Andrew and Mitrokhin, Sword and the Shield, 213.
35 Vladislov Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 274.
36 Ronald Reagan, Public Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1982
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1983), 747.
37 Reagan, Public Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), 364.
38 Mark A. Stoler, Ideology Anew, Read by author, The Teaching Company, 2008.
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Reagan also compared Soviet leaders to their most bitter of antagonists, the Nazis.
For the Soviets, the greatest source of national tragedy and pride was winning the “Great Patriotic War.” In a March 1981 interview with Walter Cronkite, Reagan said, “I remember when
Hitler was arming and had built himself up – no one’s created quite the military power that the
Soviet Union has, but comparatively he was in that way.”39 It was not the only time Reagan
associated the Soviets with their World War II adversary. In a speech to Congress, Reagan
compared the Soviet communist influences in Central America and the Caribbean with German U-boats operating in the Gulf of Mexico during the early 1940s. 40 In describing the current Soviet leadership as similar to Nazi leadership, Reagan was verbally salting the psychic
wounds incurred by millions of civilians. As one historian has noted, “Probably no American
policymaker at any time during the Cold War inspired quite as much fear and loathing in Moscow as Ronald Reagan during his first term as president.”41
The Year of Living Dangerously
In January 1983, Reagan made antagonizing the Soviets official policy when he
signed National Security Decision Directive 75 (NSDD 75), titled “US Relations with the
USSR.” NSDD 75 is the written representation of Reagan’s concept of a position of strength.
The policy calls for the US to challenge the Soviet Union militarily, subvert the authority of
the Kremlin within the USSR, and at the same time always extend an olive branch to negotiate
should the first two points aggravate Soviet leaders to the point of exhaustion on any particular
issue. 42
The most successful portion of this policy, and also potentially the most dangerous,
was its military strategy. In part, NSDD 75 reads:
The US must modernize its military forces – both nuclear and conventional
– so that the Soviet leaders perceive that the US is determined never to accept a second place or a deteriorating military posture. Soviet calculations
of possible war outcomes under any contingency must always result in outcomes so unfavorable to the USSR that there would be no incentive for Soviet leaders to initiate an attack.43
This line of thinking is contingent upon two very precarious assumptions, the first of which is
being able to guess how Soviet leaders “perceive” a situation, and, second, what their
“calculations” might be if US policymakers correctly determined the answer to the first assumption. Reagan added to this policy in a statement to Congress in June 1985, when he said
it was necessary to, “make it clear to Moscow that violations of arms control obligations entail
real costs,” and that the US should continue with strategic modernization programs “as a
hedge against the military consequences of […] Soviet violations of existing arms agreements
which the Soviets fail to correct.”44
When the two doctrines are combined, the situation reads like this: if Washington
guesses wrong on Soviet perceptions of any given situation, and then Moscow reacts in a way
that US officials did not anticipate, then US officials reserve the right to respond in a tit-for-tat
fashion based on the Soviet reaction, even though it was Washington’s failed model that al39 Ronald Reagan, Public Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), 194.
40 Reagan, PPP 1983, 601.
41 Andrew and Mitrokhin, Sword and the Shield, 242.
42 National Security Decision Directive Number 75, Federation of American Scientists,
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/index.html (accessed March 27, 2011).
43 National Security Decision Directive Number 75.
44 US Department of State, Building an Interim Framework for Mutual Restraint, Special
Report No. 131, June 10, 1985.
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lowed for the unanticipated reaction. This “miscalculation” portion of Kennedy’s 1961 warning was a real possibility in 1983.
Growing concerns over the arms race combined with a brutal economic recession led
to very low public approval numbers for Reagan during this period. After two years in office,
the financial slowdown that Reagan had blamed on Carter was still lingering, which led some
to question whether or not incurring a large national debt to finance a military modernization
project was good policy. According to a Gallup Poll, Reagan began 1983 with a paltry 35%
approval rating.45 In July 1983, Republican Senator Arlen Spector addressed this concern in a
letter to one of Reagan’s national security assistants, William P. Clark. Regarding the prospects of a new arms control summit with the Soviets, Spector wrote:
Even if the summit did not produce an agreement, I do not believe it would
‘dash expectations,’ as some suggest. Rather, a meeting between the two
leaders would demonstrate that both nations are serious about arms control.
Such a demonstration is crucial, in my opinion, to maintaining public support for our defense build-up, strategic modernization, including the MX
missile, and deployment of the Euromissiles.46
By taking this position, Specter was effectively arguing that, in a democracy, informed public
opinion is less desirable than manipulated public opinion. Specter felt that a mere façade of
good faith negotiations would be enough to drum up public support for the real bargaining
target of the administration: a position of strength.
The tension continued to rise into late summer of that year when a Soviet fighter pilot shot down Korean Airline Flight 007 over the Kamchatka peninsula in far eastern Russia.
KAL 007 had gone off course and mistakenly entered Russian air space. The fighter pilot did
not intend to kill civilians, and in fact thought he was shooting at an American military plane.
The US regularly probed Soviet radar defenses, including in the area around Kamchatka
where a major Soviet naval base was located. Tragically, after a series of technical and communications problems, in the black of night, the fighter pilot was ordered to shoot down the
plane. Only afterwards was the real identity of the craft known. Western journalists and politicians alike criticized the attack as naked aggression, and a representation of the contempt for
human life held by leaders in Moscow.47
The timing could not have been worse. The KAL incident occurred in September,
followed by weeks of demagoguery in the press. In the midst of all the posturing, both public
and private, Reagan approved a ten day NATO military exercise called Able Archer ’83 from
November 2 - 11. Author David Hoffman explains:
The exercise, Able Archer ’83, was designed to practice the procedures for a
full-scale simulated release of nuclear weapons in a European conflict. The
Soviets had long feared that training exercises could be used as a disguise
for a real attack; their own war plans envisioned the same deception. 48
Able Archer was exactly the kind of operation that RYAN was meant to detect and counter,
which only heightened tensions between the two nations, as well as the apprehensiveness of
45 Frank Newport, Jeffrey M. Jones, and Lydia Saad, “Ronald Reagan From the People’s
Perspective: A Gallup Poll Review,” Gallup News Service http://www.gallup.com/
poll/11887/ronald-reagan-from-peoples-perspective-gallup-poll-review.aspx (accessed March
29, 2011).
46 Letter, Arlen Specter to William P. Clark, July 27, 1983, WHORM: F006 03, Ronald
Reagan Library.
47 David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its
Dangerous Legacy (New York: Doubleday, 2009), 94.
48 Hoffman, The Dead Hand, 72-79.
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European allies on both sides. In carrying out the exercise, NATO forces altered their message
formats and moved non-existent forces to high alert status. KGB agents monitoring the communications and the exercise as a whole were shocked, and for a time believed that NATO was
on the precipice of a first strike against the Soviet Union.49cIn response, during the exercise,
the Soviet Fourth Air Army was also placed on an increased readiness level, and combat air
operations were called off for seven days in anticipation of NATO moves. Reagan was initially scheduled to participate personally, but after word of Soviet and allied apprehension got to
the White House, he decided against it.50 The successful completion of a mock-nuclear missile
attack only reinforced the idea that the scenario was a viable option for policymakers. Both
sides believed the other was capable of a first strike.
Despite the mounting fear and polarization caused by the events of 1983, Reagan still
clung to the NATO Dual Track policy, which necessitated Pershing II deployment. In response to a letter signed by sixteen Congressmen warning of the “increasingly dangerous”
situation, a White House aide wrote on behalf of the Reagan, that the “President believes that
making concessions just to get the Soviets back to the negotiations that they themselves broke
off would only encourage further intransigence.”51 Reagan’s negotiating policy never changed.
It was “no” to any proposal by the Soviet government that was less than the American starting
position. Gorbachev, on the other hand, was the first of the two leaders to act on the recognition of both men that the exorbitant amount of time, money, and resources being used for an
international arms race could be of far better use within the borders of their own country. Gorbachev believed the benefits to the Soviet Union from ending the arms race would outweigh
any security concerns inherent in disarmament. This recognition, and acceptance, is what
made Gorbachev so important in the INF Treaty negotiations.
Personality Goes a Long Way
The inability of Washington and Moscow to foster some level of trust between the
two governments in the early 1980s is clear. Both nations were scared of what they saw on the
other side of the world. The only reason that neither nation acted on their fear is the concept of
MAD. An American economist and professor, Thomas Schelling , articulated this point in his
book The Strategy of Conflict. Schelling wrote:
There is a difference between a balance of terror in which either side can
obliterate the other and one in which both sides can do it no matter who
strikes first. It is not the “balance” – the sheer equality or symmetry in the
situation – that constitutes mutual deterrence; it is the stability of the balance. The balance is stable only when neither, in striking first, can destroy
the other’s ability to strike back.52
The choice by Soviet leaders to deploy SS-20s within range of Western Europe, when taken
from the NATO point of view, upset the regional stability of that balance. Open criticism on
both sides, coupled with massive intelligence and military exercises like RYAN and Able
Archer, only served to exacerbate the imbalance and inflame fear of a nuclear confrontation.
Historian Melvyn Leffler explains, “Brezhnev had warned against another escalation of the
arms race and even offered to reduce the number of Soviet SS-20s if the West would talk and
not act. But NATO leaders moved ahead on 12 December [1979], saying they were wiling to
49 James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War
(New York: Viking, 2009), 77-78.
50 Hoffman, The Dead Hand, 95.
51 Letter, Lawrence Coughlin to Ronald Reagan, June 15, 1984 and Robert F. Turner to Lawrence Coughlin, July 10, 1984, WHORM: F006 03, Ronald Reagan Library.
52 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1980), 232.
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talk but would not stop their plans to deploy 464 ground-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles
in Western Europe along with 108 Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Brezhnev
and his colleagues were dismayed. The Americans were again seeking to negotiate from
strength.”53 Under Reagan, official US national security policy outlined in NSDD 75 meant
that, in reaction to the SS-20 deployment, the only option for American policymakers was to
respond in kind, and move forward with the Pershing II production and deployment.
Even before he took office, this was a point which Gorbachev understood all too
well. In his memoirs, Gorbachev wrote:
The decision to deploy SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe had reflected the
style of the Soviet leadership at the time, decision-making fraught with
grave consequences for the country. I had arrived at the sad conclusion that
this step, fateful both for our country and Europe and for the rest of the
world, had been taken without the necessary political and strategic analysis
of its possible consequences. Whatever the arguments advanced at the time
to justify the deployment of such missiles, the Soviet leadership failed to
take into account the probable reaction of the Western countries. I would
even go so far as to characterize it as an unforgivable adventure, embarked
on by the previous Soviet leadership under pressure from the militaryindustrial complex. They might have assumed that, while we deployed our
missiles, Western counter-measures would be impeded by the peace movement. If so, such a calculation was more than naïve. 54
In this single passage, Gorbachev demonstrates how history is never inevitable, but in hindsight, can seem over-determined. Before the NATO Dual Track policy of 1979, before NSDD
75 in 1983, and before Reagan’s statement to Congress in 1985, Gorbachev could see what he
felt was inevitable unfolding before his eyes. When Reagan took office, he not only upheld
the US agreement with NATO to respond directly to the SS-20 deployment, he encouraged a
massive military buildup in order to show the Soviet leaders that he was happy to play the titfor-tat game. To Reagan’s great credit, by 1985, he was also willing to play tit-for-tat on arms
reductions.
In this way, it really did take Gorbachev to break the cycle of counter deployments,
war scares, and paranoid living. Both Reagan and Gorbachev recognized the danger of perpetually testing the rationality of their governments in response to crisis. Unfortunately, Gorbachev was not the General Secretary until three consecutive Soviet leaders died while in office. As such, the possibility of continuity in already strained relations was made even more
difficult by the reality of human frailty. Between the time Reagan took office in January
1981 to the time Gorbachev took office in March 1985, Brezhnev, Andropov, and Constantine
Chernenko all passed away.
The rapid succession of Soviet leaders made it nearly impossible to build any kind of
rapport between Reagan and his Kremlin counterparts. The stability of relations between
Washington and Moscow was, from a certain point of view, dangerously reliant on the health
of two men at any given time. In both political philosophy and physical vitality, Gorbachev
represented a clear change within the Kremlin. At fifty-four Gorbachev was easily the youngest member of the Politburo. When he became General Secretary, Gorbachev was thirteen
years younger than the average age of the voting membership. 55 The INF Treaty is more than
53 Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, The Soviet Union, and the
Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 332
54 Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1996), 443-444.
55 Hoffman, The Dead Hand, 187.
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just a document: it is the written embodiment of Gorbachev’s policies and personality, based
on a life spent in and out of the Soviet Union.
The INF Treaty
Treaties are contracts between nations, enforceable by war. In the nuclear age,
breaking a treaty could mean disaster for every living thing on Earth. MAD is the foundation
of the INF Treaty, and the foundation of MAD is rationality. Throughout the Cold War both
governments tested the rationality of their policymakers by practicing brinksmanship. The
Korean War, Taiwan Straits Crisis, Cuban Missile Crisis, and even Able Archer were all tests
of rationality, which thankfully both governments continued to pass, at least on a macro level.
Following this analogy, if MAD is the foundation of the INF Treaty, then verification
is the framework. As noted above, both threats and promises are strategic moves in a “game
of nations.” But strategic moves, by definition, must also be decisions that a player, or in this
case a national government, would not normally make. Initiating MAD is not in the best interest of a rational policymaker, and is therefore a credible threat.
The promise to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether is also something that a rational
policymaker would not normally do, in part, because the United States and Soviet Union were
not the only two nations with nuclear weapons. Although the INF Treaty is bilateral, the parameters take into consideration the global balance necessary beyond their own national interests. Most notably at the time, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel also possessed nuclear weapons. It would not be in the best interest of either the US or Soviet Union to completely dismantle their nuclear arsenal in a world where the lack of such weapons would be a geopolitical disadvantage.
The agreement by Reagan and Gorbachev that nuclear war could not be won only
reinforced what generations of leaders before them understood. This can be confirmed by
analyzing the INF preamble. The treaty reads:
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Conscious that nuclear war would have
devastating consequences for all mankind, Guided by the objective of
strengthening strategic stability, Convinced that the measures set forth in
this Treaty will help reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security, and Mindful of their obligations under Article
VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, have agreed
as follows:56
While both Parties agreed that nuclear war would be terrible for all people, they are not negotiating the elimination of all nuclear weapons. They are negotiating a “strategic stability”
which will “reduce the risk” of nuclear confrontation. By eliminating short and medium range
missiles from their arsenals, both Parties reduced the amount of contingencies available to
policymakers who would otherwise consider nuclear war a possibility.
The INF Treaty is also loaded with language that speaks to the paranoid atmosphere
that came to a crescendo during Reagan’s first term. Article V, Section Three reads:
Shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall not be located at
the same elimination facility. Such facilities shall be separated by no less

56 “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles,” December 8,
1987, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/treaties/inf2.htm (accessed December 10, 2010).
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than 1000 kilometers.57

This provision is especially important because of the content found in the Memorandum of
Understanding, which accompanies the INF treaty. The Memorandum contains a list of deployment areas and missile operating bases, complete with latitude and longitude locations.
The location information makes targeting such facilities a matter of data entry. This information could be utilized to plan a first strike against the other party. If policymakers believed
a first strike based on the location information, in combination with the capability of nontheater weapons to take out ICBM locations, were likely to result in the inability of the enemy
to retaliate, then it would be rational to attack. By outlawing the possibility of a confluence of
weapons in one theatre, the possibility of achieving a first strike advantage is lost, thereby
maintaining balance.
Further proof of distrust is evident in Article XII, which deals with interference and
obfuscation. Article XII, Section Two reads:
Neither Party shall:
(a) interfere with national technical means of verification of the other Party
operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article; or
(b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance
with the provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of verification
carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 58
Both Washington and Moscow were clearly concerned that their track records regarding espionage might reveal themselves in manipulating the verification process. If it could be proven
that either side chose to act contrary to the provisions of this section, the treaty would be broken, and another escalation of nuclear tension would be likely to occur. Neither party wanted
such an outcome, but the only way to enforce such a rule is embodied in the spirit of the treaty
to begin with. That is, the point of the treaty is to reduce nuclear tension and the possibility of
war, but only if sufficient non-European theatre ICBMs are held in escrow.
The escrow of ICBMs is guaranteed by one simple concept: the elimination of all
nuclear weapons in the world does not preclude the ability to re-arm. Because of the risk involved in complete bilateral disarmament, and the cost in time and money to re-arm, it is not
rational to eliminate all nuclear weapons from a national arsenal unless and until all nuclear
weapons are banned and destroyed under unanimous international verification treaties. It is
only rational to hold as many weapons as is absolutely necessary to deter a first strike attempt
against a government’s own retaliatory capabilities. This was the goal of both Reagan and
Gorbachev. The verification promises in the INF Treaty, backed up by nuclear capabilities in
escrow, ensured that the only rational choice for both Reagan and Gorbachev would be to sign
the treaty and reap the moral and political benefits.
To further guarantee that the treaty could not be superseded, Article XIV reads: “The
Parties shall comply with this Treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or
undertakings which would conflict with its provisions.” 59 The INF was given most-favoredtreaty status.
Regarding the internal debate between Haig and Weinberger, they both got what they
wanted. Haig’s argument that the Soviet government would not negotiate until they faced a
credible threat proved to be true. But Weinberger got what he wanted with the promise of
verification. The NATO Dual Track policy was vindicated. By deploying the Pershing II
57 “INF Treaty”, Article V Section 3.
58 “INF Treaty”, Article XII, Section 2.
59 “INF Treaty”, Article XIV.
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missiles to Western Europe, and simultaneously extending the offer of bilateral arms reduction, Reagan gave the Soviets incentive to remove the SS-20s. Agreement on verification did
eliminate INF weapons from the European theatre, thereby returning the Cold War to the détente era status quo of proxy wars and interventionism. This allowed Reagan to maintain the
policies of NSDD 75 without fear of nuclear confrontation. The strategic modernization process, in combination with the INF Treaty, meant that the US had achieved unquestioned military hegemony in the world, confirming Reagan’s vision of a position of strength.
The INF Treaty was signed in the East room of the White House on December 8,
1987. In time, the treaty led to the elimination of 1,846 Soviet SS-20s, and 846 American
Pershing IIs. At the signing, Reagan said, “We have listened to the wisdom of an old Russian
maxim, doveryai, no proveryai – trust, but verify.”
“You repeat that at every meeting,” Gorbachev replied.
“I like it,” Reagan said, smiling.60
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Introduction
Aviation fuels commonly used today are extracted from the kerosene fraction of the
crude oil that is distilled between the gasoline and the diesel. Crude oil is not renewable and
the world oil reserve is generally believed to be on the decline. In 2006, about 6.3% of the
world’s refinery production was used for aviation fuel. (Nygren et al., 2009) At an estimated
rate of 3% increase of fuel demand per year, aviation use alone will consume the world fuel
production by 2026 (Nygren et al., 2009).1 Therefore, there is a need for the aviation industry
to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels and, perhaps, replace them with alternative, renewable
fuel. In addition, the use of fossil fuel negatively impacts the environment in many ways, including for example, the emission of pollutants and green house gases. (Daggett et al., 2007)
Some analyses show that the airline industry is responsible for roughly two percent of the
greenhouse gases emitted globally. Biofuel is a fuel obtainable from biological material and
can exist in the form of solid, liquid, or gas. Unlike fossil fuel, which is derived from fossils of
biological material, biofuel is renewable. Biofuel also has the advantage of biosequestration of
the atmospheric CO2 and, therefore, helps remediate greenhouse gases and, possibly, climate
change. (Bajpai et al., 2009) Studies show that fuel derived from biofuel emits at least 40%
less CO2 than current conventional jet fuels. Early biofuels were made from a variety of
sources such as, sugar, animal fats, or vegetable oil. Biodiesel is one of the first generation
biofuels that is produced from oils or fats using transesterification. Other examples include
bioalcohols, such as ethanol, propanol, and butanol. One of the more common processes used
to obtain these alcohols is fermentation of sugars by the action of enzymes in microorganisms.
Others processes include the fermentation of starches or cellulose, which is more difficult due
to their complex structures.
There are many other valuable sources of biofuel including biogas, which is produced through anaerobic digestion of organic material by anaerobes, bioethers, syngas, and
solid biofuels (eg. wood, sawdust, charcoal). Algae fuel, also known as the third generation
biofuel, seems to be one of the most promising biofuels today, particularly in terms of their
high yields. Algae have been reported to produce thirty times more energy per acre than land
crops. (Biodiesel, 2010) Moreover, algae are biodegradable and environmentally friendly.
Algae fuel is suitable for aviation use because of its low freezing point and high energy yield.
The commercial scale production, uses and regulation of biofuel is yet to be realized
by the aviation industry. Biodiesels are Fatty Acid Methyl Esters (FAMEs) and are absorbable
by metal surfaces. This causes concerns as biodiesels can adhere to pipe and tank walls.
Measures can be taken that replace the surface material with non metallic material that would
not participate in a reaction. Biodiesel has been shown to react with compounds containing
several different metals including copper, zinc, tin, lead, and cast iron. In addition to its effect
on metallic compounds, prolonged use of biofuels may lead to the deterioration of the rubber
components in the engine. (Zehra et al., 2009) The presence of rapeseed methyl esters in the
engine oil can increase corrosive wear because of the acidity of the biodiesel. (Serdari et al.,
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1999). Rapeseed methyl ester fuel also causes the lubricating oil to age faster. Degradation
due to the oxidation of biofuel can change the viscosity, acid value, and peroxide value.
(Dunn, 2005) The shelve life of biodiesel are typically six months. (Yüksek et al., 2009) Another alternative fuel that has been studied and shows potential is nitrous oxide. The raw material is abundant and is harmless to the environment as the chemical reaction produces oxygen
and water. It has a reported energy rating of 1864kJ/kg and a flash point of 850°C, compared
to 38°C for JetA fuel. Due to its high flash point and the limitation of test engine operating
range, nitrogen is yet to be extensively examined.
The B100 biofuel used in this study is a mixture of methyl esters of fatty acids. It is
made from a combination of used oil feedstock such as restaurant oil. Table 1 shows a comparison of some of the properties of kerosene with that of the B100 biofuel. The heat of combustion is lower for B100 than that of kerosene. The kinematic viscosity of B100 is about
three times higher than kerosene. The B100 fuel also has a slightly higher density as compared
to Jet A-1/kerosene. This is due to the larger chemical structure of the B100 biodiesel than
that of the kerosene, which affects the freezing point of the fuel, resulting in gelling of the
fuel. Although we have not observed in the operation of our engine, these conditions can lead
to engine operability problem and possible engine flameout. (FAA, 2009)
Property
Density (kg/m³)
Distillation Range (°C)
Kinematic Viscosity 40°C (mm²/s)
Heat of Combustion (MJ/L)
Flash Point (°C)
Freezing Point (°C)

Jet A-1
810
177 – 300
1–2
> 35.1
> 38
-47

Biofuel (B100)
880
>200
2.97
32.08
68
>0

Table 1. Comparison of fuel properties.
Engine Runs Setup
Figure 1 shows the micro turbojet engine that has been used as the test platform of
the current study. The MW54 engine runs on a single spool radial compressor and a turbine.
The combustion chamber is of the annular type with reverse flows for enhanced vaporization
and mixing of the fuel mixture. This feature makes it particularly attractive to the current
study. For operations, two types of fuel are used. Propane is used during the startup and kerosene for normal runs. The engine can operate in a manual start mode or automated start via an
engine control unit (ECU). During a run, engine operation parameters and gas properties at
the different stages along the air path can be measured.
The turbojet engine mounting bracket is secured to a tripod-like wood mount on a
test bench. The cross sectional shapes of the three mounting legs follow that of the
NACA0012 airfoil. All supply lines and electronic wirings are routed through the hollowed
rear mounting leg to the lower deck of the test bench. The turbojet engine is mounted on the
customized bracket that holds the exhaust gas temperature (EGT) sensor and load cell as illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Turbojet engine lab setup
A voltage output strain gage type of load cell is installed on the bottom plate of the engine
mount to measure thrust. Figure 2 illustrates the placement of the load cell and the measurement technique used. The thrust line, F1, above the pivot pins of the upper plate, where the
engine is mounted, creates a moment that applies a force, F2, directly onto the load cell. Using
simple moment summation, the engine thrust F1 can be calculated. To account for friction,
calibrations are performed by transferring dead weights forces parallel to the propeller thrust
line through a pulley system. We have also used the same setup to ensure the integrity of the
engine mount to beyond the maximum obtainable thrust of the turbojet.

Figure 2. Thrust Management
Engine exhaust gas temperature (EGT) is measured using a thermocouple. A case pressure
port is installed with a digital pressure gage to provide a digital readout from the computer. A
single fuel flow meter and a single fuel pump are installed on the engine fuel supply line. A
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FADEC ECU pre-programmed by WREN Turbines, incorporating a fuzzy logic-based control
algorithm that adapts to the different engine parameters when it operates, monitors the engine
run parameters and controls the fuel supply to the engine. It ensures that the engine operates
within the programmed specification through engine speed (RPM), EGT, and throttle level. In
case of an apparent inconsistency among the engine operating parameters that may indicate an
abnormal engine run, for instance, between the RPM and the exhaust gas temperature, the
ECU will automatically shut down the engine. A 0.5 inch steel plate is mounted perpendicular
to the turbine plane of rotation, and away from the line of sight in front of the control room
window.
Multiple LabVIEW programs have been developed in house to perform different
tasks. (Liou and Leong, 2007) One of the LabVIEW programs developed is the Engine Control Interface (ECI) that will measure, manage, and control pneumatic valves, relays, and sensors. Data acquisition (DA) can be executed on demand through the ECI. Parameters displayed in the front-end LabVIEW program are provided by the ECU with a RJ45 connector
through a serial port (RS-232) connection. This provides real time data to the DA, which is in
sync with the ECU. This real time data can be stored in text file format. The throttle level on
the ECU is controlled through the LabVIEW front end to provide a stable signal source. In
case of a computer failure, the ECU will be able to detect and shut down the engine immediately to prevent a loss of engine control and other undesirable scenarios. A change of the
throttle level in the LabVIEW front end triggers a signal sent to the ECU, which varies the
power input to the fuel pump and the fuel flow to the engine, resulting in changes of engine
RPM, pressure, EGT, and thrust. The fuel pump power is controlled by the ECU “fuzzy logic”
system correlating a 1024 step division to the fuel pump power supplied to the ECU. With a
calibrated throttle level, the ECU will regulate the fuel pump power according to the throttle
level desired, while monitoring the RPM and EGT as feed backs.
The fuel used in the present engine runs includes kerosene and its mixture with the
B100 biofuel. The mixing ratio varies from 0%, which contains only kerosene, to 100%,
which contains only the B100 biofuel. We have run fuels with mixture ratio of 0%, 5%, 10%
and subsequent increments of 10% up to 100%. The fuel is mixed with Mobile Jet Oil II for
lubrication purposes at a ratio of 20:1. The engine characteristics such as the thrust, RPM, fuel
consumption, and EGT are reported in the following.
Results
The following presents the results of the turbojet engine runs using the various
blends of the B100 fuel with kerosene at ten different mixing ratios, from kerosene only (0%)
to B100 fuel only (100%). The data are collected continuously onto a spreadsheet using the
LabVIEW program and then analyzed. Figure 3 shows the variation of the engine RPM with
the throttle level in terms of its percentage of the full throttle. The engine speed increases linearly with the throttle level for all mixing ratios considered and the engine speeds are the same
at the same throttle level. With the increase of the mixing ratio, or blending more biofuel with
kerosene, the RPM value shows a flat region. This flat RPM values first appears at the highest
throttle level tested and then becomes wider as the mixing ratio increases. The ECU fuel flow
control was manufactured to operate the engine using kerosene as fuel. The high viscosity of
the B100 biofuel demands higher fuel pump power at the same throttle position than that regulated by the kerosene-based ECU.
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Figure 3. Engine speed variation with the throttle level.
Figure 4 shows the variation of the engine thrust with the throttle level. The engine thrust
increases with the throttle level. The thrust values show a very consistent change with the
throttle level for all blends of fuel. In Figure 5, the engine thrust is shown against the engine
RPM. For runs with all of the various blending of the biofuels, the measured engine thrust
varies in a consistent manor with the engine RPM, showing that the operational performance
of the engine has not changed during the runs. Figure 6 shows the changes of the EGT with
engine speed. The overall trends of the EGT variation are fairly consistent across all blends
and all RPM. The temperature of the exhaust gas stream varies significantly with radial distance to the jet centerline. Since the thermal couple is only loosely fitted through a hole on the
wall of the nozzle, the location of the temperature probe, being exposed to the high speed exhaust stream, can shift from one engine run to the next and causes the observed variations.

Figure 4. Engine thrust variation with fuel mixing ratio
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Figure 5. Consistency of engine performance thrust variation with engine speed.

Figure 6. Engine exhaust gas temperature.
As mentioned earlier, engine characteristic data are continuously sampled by using
the LabVIEW program front end that is used to run the engine. Table 2 shows a summary of
the satistics of some of the quantaties sampled over a period of time at a single throttle level.
The distributions of EGT, thrust, and RPM have standard deviations (STD) of less then 1% of
the mean values. Figure 7 shows the distribution of the occuring count of the sampled RPM
data in the same time period.
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Table 2. Statistics of measurement.
RPM (x1000)

EGT (°C)

Thrust (lbf)

STD

0.219

1.307

0.0243

MIN

91.2

292

2.21

MAX

92.1

298

2.319

MEDIAN

91.8

294

2.251

MOD

91.8

294

2.251

Figure 7. Engine RPM distribution.
The measured fuel volume flow rates are shown in Figure 8. The fuel pumped to the
engine increases with RPM. This is observed for all mixing ratios, from 0% to 100%. There is
an apparent downward shift of the total fuel consumption by volume, signifying a reduction of
fuel consumed, with the increse of the mixing ratio. Recall that the 0% blend contains only
kerosene and the 100% fuel blend only B100 biofuel. The fuel consumption decreases with
the increased percent of the biofuel. The biofuel combustion at the relatively fuel-lean conditions is more complete and this can further reduce CO2 emmission. Figure 9 shows the correlation between the fuel consmption and the thrust produced. Engine thrust is seen to increase
wth the increased amount of fuel pumped to the engine for all the mixing ratios used. With the
same fuel volume flow rate, the engine thrust increases with the increased percentage of biofuel used in the blending. For instance, at the fuel flow rate of 30 mL/min, the run using the
B100 biofuel produced 200% more thrust compared to that by using kerosene. The heating
value of the biofuel used is somewhat lower than that of kerosene. Therefore, the trend apparently indicate a more efficient combustion of the biofuel in the present engine.
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Figure 8. Volume fuel flow rate variation with engine speed.

Figure 9. Engine thrust variation with different fuel mixing ratio.
The variations of thrust specific fuel consumption (TSFC) with the throttle level are
shown in Figure 10. For the 0% fuel blend (or kerosene), the value of TSFC decreases by
about 40% with the throttle level increasing from 10% to 90%. TSFC is also observed to decrease with the increased amount of biofuel in the fuel blend. The trend continues and the pure
biofuel has the lowest TSFC at the three throttle levels tested. For example, at 50% throttle
level, the TSFC value for the B100 biofuel run is 56% lower than that using kerosene.
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Figure 10. Engine thrust specific fuel consumption variation with fuel mixing ratio.
The low TSFC of the engine when the B100 biofuel is used can be contributed to
factors such as the higher cetane index found in the biofuel than in kerosene. (Schulze and
Pinder, 2008) The higher biofuel viscosity has been found to improve the fuel-air mixing and
result in a more complete combustion. (Ali et al., 1995), (Ali et al., 1995) Studies have also
shown a higher thermal efficiency for biofuel, which leads to a more efficient conversion of
chemical energy to kinetic energy. (Habib et al., 2010), (Xuea et al., 2011)
Table 3 show estimates of the fuel costs for running the present turbine engine on
three different blends of fuel, from kerosene to B100 biofuel, for one thousand hours. The
estimated cost increases by a factor of about six between the cases of using the kerosene and
the B100 biofuel. It should be noted that the estimates are based on our costs of purchasing the
kerosene from a retail store and the B100 biofuel from a government-subsidized biofuel provider. Although the comparison may not reflect the true cost of the biofuel, the significant
improvement of the engine performance in terms of TSFC using biofuel is reliable evidence
for potential saving in cost.
Table 3. One thousand hours operation cost comparison based on a kerosene retail price of
$2.11 per liter and B100 at $1.06.
Fuel Blend

Cost

Kerosene
50% B100-Kerosene

$11744
$4954

100% B100

$1883
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Concluding Remarks
The results presented showed that the turbine engine can operate and perform in a
consistent manner when the various blends of fuel were used, producing the same amount of
thrust at the same engine speed. The engine thrust specific fuel consumption was found to be
significantly lower for the B100 biofuel than kerosene. The more efficient combustion of the
biofuel represents a significant saving in the cost of running the turbojet engine. It also indicates a possible reduction of green house gas emission from the engine. For future work, the
contents of the exhaust gas can be sampled and measured. Such studies will provide a quantitative analysis of the emission content of the gas turbine engine runs on biofuels.
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The Art and Beauty of Flight
This picture nicely represents the art and gracefulness of flight with the beauty of sunset in a tranquil setting. In the picture is a powered paragliding, also
known as paramotoring in the plains of Nebraska. The ability to fly both low
and slow safely, the 'open' feel, the minimal equipment and maintenance
costs, the portability, minimally regulated and requires no license are claimed
to be this type of flying's greatest merits. Paramotors can be flown during any
season of the year anywhere but not in high wind conditions which typically
means at low Sun azimuths as shown in the picture of the para-glider gracefully flying into the sunset horizon, when wind turbulence is usually low.
WMU Sunseeker Solarcar
This picture was taken, at the racetrack the evening before the start of the
North American Solar Challenge 2008 race in Plano, Texas. In this picture is
the Sunseeker, Western Michigan University’s solar powered car that will
race in the 2 week long, 2400miles long race from Plano, Texas to Calgary,
Canada. Sunseeker was the only car in that race that feature a 2 electric motor
drive system than the standard one electric motor drive system. Western
Michigan University Sunseeker team brought back the sportsmanship award
that year.
HOPE
This drawing—painted on the surface of one of the interior doors located in
the first floor at East Hall—shows the preoccupation of people about the uncertain future of East Campus. In one way or another, it has kept awake my
sensibility toward how educational institutions can affect community not only
academically, but also personally, and how people consider education as a
one of the foremost elements for progress. Location: East Hall, First Floor.
Original painting by unknown artist.
ANTIQUE POWER (Cover)
Location: Political Science Collection, Second Floor, Waldo Library
These are one of the oldest books that can be found in the political science
collection at Waldo Library. To have access to antique historical compilation
is an enormous privilege which has allowed me to explore the old world
through original sources.
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LA NOCHE DE LOS MAYAS: A MISUNDERSTOOD FILM
AND ITS MUSIC
By Abderrahman Anzaldua
School of Music
a.e.abderrahmanbenmohammad@wmich.edu
Introduction
My interest in La Noche de los Mayas began to form when I read Cartas íntimas y
escritos.1 This is a recompilation made by Rosaura Revueltas of letters and writings by his
brother Silvestre Revueltas. The book made every bibliographical research on Revueltas before 1982 meaningless and it is referenced in nearly all of the research conducted on Revueltas
today. In his letters and writings Revueltas freely describes his thoughts and emotions with
incredible detail. They contain first hand proof of how Revueltas composed his music and in
some cases the reasons for it. It is only recently that scholars such as Eduardo Contreras Soto,
Roberto Kolb and Robert Parker have worked meticulously on documenting his life and works
to provide a fresh understanding of the mind of Silvestre Revueltas. Today’s research of Revueltas’ music points to the same direction; Revueltas’ pinnacle of compositional technique
was in his film music.
The intention of this study is to explore and evaluate the film La Noche de los Mayas.
I will research the making of the movie and what surrounded the production in 1939. In addition to this, I will seek a perspective of the music of Revueltas and its relation with the film.
With this research I intend to acknowledge the importance that this film had in its time, and
expectantly decipher the enigma that impedes its popularity today compared to other films of
the ‘Golden Age’ of cinema in Mexico.
Silvestre Revueltas’ path to Film Music
Silvestre Revueltas once wrote, “The spirit of Mexico is deep within me." 2 Historically Revueltas was mistaken for a composer who would incorporate traditional folk tunes into
his music, but today this history is corrected. Unlike other composers of his time, Revueltas
did not exploit Mexican folklore and music, but instead subtly formed a compositional style
that is comparable to a ‘nationalistic’ compositional manner like that of Sergei Prokofiev or
Dimitri Shostakovich to Russia. His music has gained vast popularity in contemporary music
society, and it is the subject of research for many musicologists and musicians around the
world.
Silvestre Revueltas (1899-1940) lived a life filled with emotions, passion and tragedy. Known to the world as almost certainly the greatest composer Mexico has produced, Revueltas was also one of the finest violin players of his time. At a very young age his talent was
noticed, and eventually he was sent abroad to nourish his evident talent. Revueltas completed
most of his studies outside Mexico thanks to his father who wanted only the best for his son.
He then spent his youth in Chicago where he was accepted to study violin and composition at
the “Chicago Musical College.” To this day a medal is held at the college in his honor for his
achievements in excellence.
1 Silvestre Revueltas, Cartas íntimas y escritos. 1a ed. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica,
1982.
2 “El espíritu de México está muy dentro de mí…”(All translations in this article are made by
me unless otherwise noted.)
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Revueltas came from a poor family and struggled all his life with this issue. He had
to juggle his scholarly pursuits with a working life. Because of this, Revueltas played in many
orchestras for film theaters to make ends meet. The experience that this provided was directly
influential on his compositional career. From his first known musical writing, there exists an
air of imagery and movement that would later in his life represent his musical form of composition. In the text Mexican Movies in the United States: a History of the Films, Theaters, and
Audiences, 1920-1960 Rogelio Agrasànchez’ describes how Revueltas moved from playing in
these theaters to being commissioned to compose the music for them. Most of his films were
later presented in the same theaters were Revueltas once performed. 3
In his lifetime, he composed eight films scores in a period of five years. His first
commissioned score was for the film Redes in 1935.4 The rapid success that the film attracted
in combination with the quality of the music quickly provided Revueltas with a career in the
film industry. Revueltas’ patriotism drew him to the nationalist themes that the films of this
period evoked. All the film scores that Revueltas composed were for movies that served as
government propaganda or films with a sense of patriotism and nationalistic pride for Mexico.
Revueltas’ greatest achievement as a composer came from his ability to compose new music
that evoked the Mexican spirit without using folksy or cliché tunes. In the course of the next
few years, Revueltas rapidly became known for his film scores and was asked to write the
scores for many of the new films being produced. These include ¡Vámonos con Pancho Villa!
(1936), Ferrocarriles de Baja California (1938), La Bestia Negra (1938), El Indio (1938), La
Noche de los Mayas (1939), Bajo el Signo de la muerte (1939), and ¡Que viene mi marido!
(1940). In his text “La Música de Silvestre Revueltas para Cine y Escena,” Eduardo Contreras
Soto provides a discussion on how Revueltas suffered from severe depression resulting from
the death of his mother.5 For Revueltas this depression came at the peak of his compositional
career in the film industry. Even though his final film scores produced income, he announced
his retirement from film composing. Not long after, a complicated case of pneumonia, in combination with his alcoholism, took his life in October of 1940 at the age of 40.
1939: The Film Industry in Mexico
Between 1935 and 1938 work in the Mexican film industry grew intensely. This constant growth came to a halt in 1939 when the industry grew to a point at which it could no
longer support itself. Based on the industriy’s growth in previous years, it was expected that at
least 100 movies would be produced in 1939 alone. The reality was that in 1939 only 39 movies were produced and most of these films were not released. The film’s producers were hesitant to present the film in theaters alongside the films being brought in from Hollywood. These films had an advantage over the films being produced by the Mexican film industry and the
producers of the film were concerned about recouping their investments in the oversaturated
market. To compensate for this, former president Làzaro Cardenas obliged every cinema in
Mexico to expose at least one Mexican movie per month.

3 Rogelio Agrasánchez, Mexican Movies in the United States: a history of the films, theaters, and audiences, 1920-1960. (North Carolina: McFarland & Co., 2006), 23-34.
4 Silvestre Revueltas composed the score for the film Redes in 1934-1935. It was released
in the United States as The Waves.
5 Eduardo Contreras Soto, “La música de Silvestre Revueltas para cine y escena,” Heterofonìa nos. 111-12 (July 1994- June 1995): 5-14.
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With the excess films from the Hollywood industry hitting Mexico at their peak, only
two films conserved a nationalist thematic pride. These two movies were Chano Urueta’s La
Noche de los Mayas and Los de abajo. Urueta was indisputably the most talented director in
the industry at that time. While other directors produced movies of foreign inspiration, Urueta
did everything in his power to detach himself from the ‘great’ foreign productions and create a
grand Mexican tradition.
1939 was definitely a very hard year for the film industry in Mexico. While Cardenas
would try to satisfy the common people as well as the producers, the film industry in Mexico
plunged. The effect was alarming. Producers were unable to finance their independent productions to the same extent as the film industry in other countries. At that time, Argentina rose in
the film industry for its ability to finance their productions. This period produced over 50
movies, giving them, for the first time, the reins in the production of Spanish-language films.
Meanwhile, the end of the war in Spain in 1939 lead to the revival of film manufacturing and
gave Spain a corner on the market. In 1939 Mexico produced mostly low budget movies. This
left a stigma on Mexican cinema of the period shadowing most of the movies produced this
year.
Emilio Riera’s Historia documental del Cine Mexicano 1938-1942 meticulously catalogs the events of the Mexican film industry and proves that although 1939 was a devastating
year for the industry, Mexico’s National Film Committee, Comite Nacional de Cine en Mexico
(UTECM), still saw the importance of a number of films from the year and acknowledged
them with high honors. These honors included the awards for best movie to La Noche de los
Mayas, best director to Fernando de Fuentes for La Casa del Ogro, best actress to Isabela Corona for La Noche, best photography to Gabriel Figueroa for La Noche, best music to Silvestre
Revueltas for La Noche, best edition to Emilio Gomez for La Noche and best scenery Jose
Rodriguez Granada and Roberto Montenegro for El Capitàn Aventurero.6
La Noche de los Mayas
Conductor Jose Ives Limantour arranged Revueltas’ film score into an orchestral four
movement suite and premiered it with the Guadalajara Symphony Orchestra on January 30,
1961. Many scholars who research Revueltas’ music question the authenticity of the work,
though in essence it stays very much attached to what the film reflected. I will mention some
audio examples and make reference to recordings of this arrangement; which is the version
most often performed in concert halls today.7 Limantour arranged the suite using Revueltas’
original score. This explains why there is so much material contained in the suite that is not
used in the context of the film. Limantour’s arranged suite is divided into four parts, just as the
original film score. It is important to mention that Revueltas did not name these four parts,
rather Limantour named them based on his judgment of what was happening during the film.
Revueltas’ actual distribution contains only ‘cue’ spots and scenes markings. The first movement of Limantour’s arrangement is titled La Noche de los Mayas (Night of the Mayans), the
second Noche de Jaranas (Night of ‘Revelry’),8 the third Noches de Yucatàn (Nights of Yucatan) and last movement, Noches de Encantamiento (Nights of Enchantment). The music that
6 Emilio Riera, Historia documental del Cine Mexicano 1938-1942, (Mexico: Universidad de
Guadalajara, 1992), 89-107.
7 A percussion cadenza was added in the final movement by Enrique Arturo Diemecke, the
conductor of the National Symphonic Orchestra of Mexico 15 years ago with the permission of the Revueltas family.
8 The word ‘Jarana’ also refers to the name of a traditional dance which blend traditional and
native influences.
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appears in the film, mostly without any edition, is generally contained within the first and second movements of Limantour’s suite. The third movement is included within the context of
the film, but is heavily edited by Limantour to produce a cohesive standalone movement. The
fourth movement, however, is not heard within the film itself. The reason for not hearing any
of the themes of the last movement is because the music was intended to highlight the ‘native
percussion music’ of the film which, in the end, Urueta leaned more towards the use of Cornelio Cardenas’ ‘Mayan Melodies’ in a more diagetic fashion. The end of the last movement is
a restatement of the theme of the first movement. This addition made by Limantour was to
highlight how Revueltas repeats the first movement to end the movie.
The remainder of this study will focus mainly on the first and second moments of
Limantour’s suite. The reason for this is that the first and second movements contain the least
editorial work, leaving them the closest to the original film music of all of the movements.
The story of the La Noche is set in a Mayan tribe which subsists with very little
awareness of the outer modern civilization. A hunter in the tribe named Uz (Arturo Cordoba)
is in love with Lol (Estela Inda), a beautiful indigenous girl who seems to love Uz until the
intrusion of a white explorer named Miguel (Luis Aldas). Miguel sells the ‘chicle’ trees which
grow around the village that he and his envoy discover. This is where the love triangle happens. Miguel wants Lol, though there is never a sense of falling in love. In contrast to what the
movie portrays, it seems that he rapes her and it isn’t until this point that she falls in love with
him. This profane relationship provokes the wrath of the gods, which in the movie translates to
draughts and hunger for the village. Once the elders become aware of this relationship, they
determine that the only logic solution is to sacrifice Lol in order to keep the Gods content.
The movie concludes with Uz killing Miguel. Lol commits suicide after witnessing Miguel’s
death and ‘magically’ (or coincidental) it begins to rain, ending the curse of the village.
In Eduardo Contreras’ “Historia de La Noche de los Mayas y de su Música,” we understand the importance of La Noche de los Mayas being filmed in the unpopular Yucatan of
the mid 1930’s.9 The importance that the film had over the people in Merida was overwhelming. The making of La Noche was probably the most important event that had happened in the
city. Everything surrounding the film at the time was published and sometimes exaggerated in
the local media. One of the most interesting headlines noted that the music for the much anticipated film was written by local composer Cornelio Cardenas. More importantly it stated that
the music was already recorded and ready to send to the editing departments. Despite these
headlines, Urueta had already asked Revueltas to write a score for the film. At the end of the
production, Cardenas’ music plays a different role in the film. Cardenas music is used strictly
in a diegetic role. Two very clear examples of this appear within the film. The first at (min.
00:51:13 to 00:54:25) were the villagers are playing the drums. This scene is designed to appear improvised, though it was written by Cardenas. The music that Revueltas wrote for this
moment can clearly be heard in Limantour’s arranged suite at the beginning of the variations
of the last movement (min. 1:20 and following).10 The second is where Lol is singing to Miguel in her ‘native’ language although Miguel seems not to understand what she sings
(min.00:36:15 to 00:36:34). This scene also plays a significant conceptual role within the context of the film. Urueta’s use of a ‘Mayan’ folk song is related to the codices left by the Mayas
that emphasis the importance of voice in Mayan culture.

9 Eduardo Contreras Soto, “Historia de La Noche de los Mayas y de su Música,” Camino
blanco: arte y cultura, (September November 2002): 47-52.
10 Silvestre Revueltas with WDR Sinfonieorchester Köln Semyon Bychkov, Noche de
Encantamiento. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n6BM32A_9OU&feature=related
(Accessed April 2010)
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To highlight the reality of an undiscovered indigenous land, language plays a vital
function in the narrative of the film. The whole movie is set in Spanish, though when the Mayans speak they do so in a poetic form. When the white people enter the village there is a
translator from poetic-Spanish to Spanish. At first this seems slightly confusing because the
first time this ‘issue’ is encountered one does not realize that the Mayans are actually speaking
‘Mayan’. As the movie moves forward, this theatrical approach to the language contrasts
greatly when the camera is focusing on the villagers or the white men. Antonio Mediz Bollo,
who wrote the novel for which the movie is based on, played an important role in the circumstance of the dialogues and use of theatrical gestures within the movie.
The opening credits feature an orchestral introduction by Revueltas. While it has become traditional to open a film with a grand fanfare, Revueltas chooses to open the film with a
dramatic introduction, but he avoids the sense of a fanfare or march altogether. Example 1
demonstrates the equal importance of both the strings and the brass in the opening of the film.
The credits emphasize, “Musical Illustration” by Silvestre Revueltas “Mayan melodies” by
Cornelio Cardenas (min. 00:02:15-00:02:26) Both names appear in the same shot, side by
side; today the music is credited mostly to Revueltas. Cardenas’ score seems to have been lost
with-in the production of the film. Cardenas’ score was almost certainly never fully composed.
Potentially, this could have even been set up as a publicity stunt to signify the local community and its relation to the film. During all the commotion in Merida, Revueltas was never mentioned until the end of the production of the film. There is no record of Revueltas actually being in the Yucatan during the filming, and certainly no headlines in any newspaper acknowledged him as the composer for the film. The only actual proof is a letter from Urueta to Revueltas asking him if he had received the material to compose the score for La Noche. If Revueltas was mentioned more often than Cardenas, the community in the Yucatan wouldn’t
have supported filming in the ancient ruins. It was very important that the local entities permitted the shooting in the actual sites because they play a major role in the film.
Example 1. La Noche de los Mayas by Silvestre Revueltas. Movment 1, mm 1-4 11

11 Example taken from Dissertation: Jonathan Borja. “Silvestre Revueltas’s La Noche de los
Mayas: His Music on Film and on the Concert Stage” Masters diss., University of Missouri-Kansas, 2002.
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One of the few prizes the film did not win was for scenery. This was because the sets
were all genuine landscapes.12 Gabriel Figuero developed the photography of the film. The
majority of the film gives the sense that the space used is very wide, though in reality most of
the important scenes take place in closed spaces.
After the opening credits, the music contrasts to the majesty of the opening to a melodious tune emphasized by the flue and the violin section (Example 2). At this moment in the
film, the camera is panning scenes of the Yucatan Peninsula. This is truly a precious moment
in the Mexican cinematic tradition as the scenes of the ruins of Yucatan can never again be
shot in such a ‘virgin’ state. Urueta’s goal in the film’s introduction was to be able to portray
the innocence of the community of the Mayan village. Revueltas writes in his cue notes, “…
Historic innocence of the native peoples of Mesoamerica.” 13
Example 2 La Noche de los Mayas by Silvestre Revueltas. Movement 1. mm 29-33. 14

Arguably the most important moment in the film is when Miguel is allowed in the
village for the first time. Miguel gives Lol a glance that is noticed by Uz from the background.
This at first seems like an innocent scene; despite the fact that in the music is contrasted with a
dissonant interjection by the tuba exactly in the moment that Uz’s acknowledges the moment
occurred (min. 00:17:20-00:18:13). This is a key point in the film because it foreshadows the
events to come. For example, two of Revueltas’ Noche de Jaranas score examples contrast the
upbeat cheery music of the strings with the descending second interval in the tuba. Most recordings of Noche de Jaranas do not make a big deal out of this moment, yet in the film, the
tuba can clearly be heard overpowering the strings (min 07:05 – 07:11).15
12 The shooting in the film took places in the actual Mayan ruins in the peninsula of Yucatan;
Chechenitza, Tulum and Cobà.
13 “…inocencia histórica de los indígenas de Mesoamerica.”
14 Example taken from Dissertation: Jonathan Borja. “Silvestre Revueltas’s La Noche de los
Mayas: His Music on Film and on the Concert Stage” Masters diss., University of Missouri-Kansas, 2002.
15 Silvestre Revueltas with WDR Sinfonieorchester Köln Semyon Bychkov, Noche de Jaranas. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HTEh1A9Ur8E&feature=related (Accessed April
2010).
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Revueltas’ sensitivity in bringing out particular moments in his film scores is fascinating. Despite having only a short period of time to complete the music for La Noche, he was
able to create an atmospheric blend that allowed for the diagetic sounds of the movie to be
carefully balanced with the sensation of originality in the score. Although the majority of the
film`s music is contained within the first thirty minutes of the film, its masterful craftsmanship
begs for further analysis.
Conclusion
The film La Noche de los Mayas has barely survived the overwhelming attacks from
the international film industry. Despite its popularity when it was premiered on Mexico’s Independence Day, the film has been reduced to just a memory of its music. While the film only
persists outside of the Mexican mainstream, its music is gaining incredible popularity worldwide. The film La Noche is truly an undiscovered work of art waiting for its re-mastering.
Though the film has lost much of its attractiveness, the second film premiered that same year,
Bajo el Signo de la Muerte, has survived time and industry attacks alike. Bajo el Signo de la
Muerte was also directed by Urueta and the music was also written by Revueltas. Two things
made this film more popular. The budget used for this movie was far higher than that of La
Noche de los Mayas, allowing to improve some influential aspects of the film. For instance, the
sound recording and musician quality in La Noche suffered from a very low budget and is
greatly reflected in the quality of interpretation of Revueltas’ score. Secondly, La Noche suffered from a low casting budget and couldn’t compare with the superstar lineup used in Bajo el
Signo de la Muerte; the later including legends like Mario Moreno ‘Cantinflas.’ Though Estela
Inda’s participation in La Noche was formidable, she was still not recognized as a treasure of
Mexican cinema until later in her career.
Limantour’s work with the music of Revueltas is pivotal to the survival of this music.
If it wasn’t for his genuine interest in preserving the film music, much of the material gathered
by Limantour would have been lost. Hindemith wrote his own arrangement of La Noche, but
this is just a 15 min. arrangement of the film score. Still Limantour’s study on La Noche is
much more focused, rounding up more of the visual content of the film, rather than just the
musical.
I truly believe that the film will never gain a popularity after losing its momentum in
the early 1940`s though I still think that La Noche is an essential part of Mexican films and its
research will lead (and has lead) further research in the area of cinematography. The legacy left
by the combination of Urueta and Revueltas to the film scene is unique and plays and outstanding role in film studies.
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Introduction
Economic society is defined mostly by the competitiveness of its private sector and
the effectiveness of its economic policies. Nevertheless, understand the dynamics that lead a
nation to economic development compels the analysis of other factors, which, it is de rigueur
to point out, do not have an economic nature, but a significant influence on national economic
strategies, i.e. history and government.
The history of developing countries, particularly their colonial experience, has a remarkable impact on their political and economic performance. The dynamics between colonies and colonizers constitute the basis in which the estate and its institutions were created.
“The impact of colonialism on state formation was especially significant because most developing country states are the product of colonialism, and their respective forms were molded
decisively by this encounter with more advanced political economies” (Kohli, 2004, 17).
Consequently, it is not possible “to formulate adequate development theory and policy for the
majority of the world’s population who suffer from development without first learning how
their past economic and social history gave rise to their present underdevelopment” (Kanth,
1994, 149).
The state has the capabilities to improve economy, especially in developing countries, where the market does work with imperfections, and the “government is constantly
asked to rectify market error or market inequity”. Moreover, in poor societies the private sector does not increase its operations if the government does not take participation in the national market (Lewis, 1984, 4). “Many neoclassical economists would accept that markets for
technology development, manpower training, and credit to small firms and exporters may
failure seriously enough to warrant some offsetting government intervention” (Wade,
2004,12).
Therefore, two important questions arise: 1) can private sector reach efficiency without government provision? and 2) are public policies drawn to colonialism? The responses for
these two questions will be addressed by the political and economic analysis of Cuba – a nation, which in the fifteenth century, was colonized by Spain during the maritime expeditions
of Christopher Columbus, and after the Revolution –led by Fidel Castro, became in the twentieth century a totalitarian state-run economy.
Cuba is not only the largest island in the Greater Antilles, but also the only communist island in the Caribbean. This country has been governed by the Marxist-Leninist ideology for more than fifty years. Although the Cuban economy has not shown significant development since January 1, 1959, i.e. when the Revolutionaries came to power, it is presenting a new economic capability—the tourism industry, which could drive the nation to a moderate economic growth.
The tourism sector is the primary provider of foreign exchange earnings and employment in Cuba, exceeding agriculture –which since the old days of colonization used to be the
economic leader sector. (Khrushchev, Henthorne, and Latour, 2007, 403). After the Second
World War, Cuba presented a competitive economic environment, which in case of had being
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conserved by the government of Fidel Castro, it would bring excellent opportunities to develop the Cuban economy; i.e. improve the industries (public and private), strength relations between state and private sector, increase international market operations, and enhance standards
of livelihood.
The Cuban economy, in contrast to many economies at the time, was not dramatically
affected by the war. Foreign entrepreneurs could find in Cuba an ideal environment for investment, e.g. the Cuban investment market was one of the most sustainable in Latin America and
the Caribbean; the Constitution of 1940 guaranteed the protection of property in Cuba; the
Cuban peso was at par with U.S. dollar; foreign exchange operations were not under state control, and the cost of living did not present important variations (Baklanoff, 1998, 268).
Nevertheless, despite this favorable economic scenario, Cuban development prospects proved to be unpredictable. As a Marxist-Leninist country, Cuba had isolated its people
from globalisation and its economy from free market. Fidel Castro refuses to consider foreign
industries and investment as the engine for economic growth. The foundation of his economic
policies are based on the dependency theory of Andre Gunder Frank, which states that developing countries will not economically improve if they maintain “importing sterile stereotypes
from the metropolis which do not correspond to their satellite economic reality and do not
respond to their liberating political needs” (Kanth, 1994, 159).
Fidel Castro contemplates an agricultural sector protected by the state as the train that
would take the Cuban economy straightly to development.
“Cuba is above all an agricultural state. Its population is largely rural. The
city depends on these rural areas. The rural people won the independence.
The greatness and prosperity of our country depends on a healthy and vigorous rural population that loves the land and knows how to till it, within the
framework of a state that protects and guides them” (Fidel Castro, History
Will Absolve Me, 1953).
Consequently, he believes that American economic intervention is not the key for
economic growth. Nonetheless, American private capital proved to have the capability to improve the condition of living through its economic and political influence during the precommunist period (Bernstein, 1966, 145). Atul Kohli bases his development theory on the role
of the “state as an economic actor” and the importance of a close relationship between government and private sector in order to lead the nation to economic growth.
“Patterns of state authority (neopatrimonial, cohesive-capitalist, and fragmented-multiclass) including how the politics of the state are organized and
how state power is used have decisively influenced the economic context
within which private economic decisions are made” (Kohli, 2004, 2).
Based on the development theory of Kohli, the performance of the Cuban tourism,
and the Marxist-Leninist government of Cuba, four leading questions guide this research: 1)
can tourism lead Cuban economy to development? 2) do public policies alienate the tourism
sector? 3) is the state of Cuba offering an attractive environment for foreign direct investment?
4) does the embargo of the United States restrain Cuban tourism?
This paper will be developed in five sections. The foundation of the Cuban economy
during the Spanish colonization (1492-1899) will be described in section one. The golden
years of the Cuban tourism (1952-1958) will be discussed in section two. The situation of
tourism after the Revolution (1959-1969) will be explained in section three. The economic
perspective of the embargo of the United States on Cuba (1963) will be defined in section
four. The government tourism reforms will be presented in section five. The paper closes with
some observations about the improvement and capabilities of the Cuban tourism sector and its
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development prospects.
The Spanish Colonization: Foundation of the Cuban Economy
“While building its large empire in America, Spain paid scant attention to Cuba.”
(Cuban Economic Research Project, 1975, 4)
Tourism in Cuba did not developed as economic sector during the Spanish colonization. “A study of the history of Cuba, both internal and external, is fundamentally a history of
sugar and tobacco as the essential bases of its economy” (Ortiz, 1970, 4-5). Nonetheless, it is
important to state that agriculture was not always the most prominent economic sector, and
Cuba was not always an outstanding colony.
Christopher Columbus reached the island of Cuba on October 28, 1492 –fifteen days
after he landed for the first time in America. In his journal he described Cuba as follows: “I
never saw a lovelier sight: trees everywhere, lining the river, green and beautiful. They are not
like our own, and each has its own flowers and fruit. Numerous birds, large and small, singing
away sweetly… It is the most beautiful island even seen…” (Simons, 1996, 77, 79). Even
though Columbus named the new island Juana, in honour of the Prince, Don Juan, son of the
Spanish monarchs (Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon); it conserved its native name
–the aboriginal people used the word Colba to refer the island, word that the Spanish understood to be Cuba (Wright, 1970, 5-6).
Nevertheless, the finding of Mexico – Hernán Cortés’ s expedition sailed from Cuba
“in 1519 to conquer the Aztec Empire”, and the lack of minerals of the island would soon diminish the fascination for Cuba. Mexico and its abundant mineral resources seemed to promise a large treasury for the Spanish adventures and for the Catholic kingdom. However, despite
the “exodus of population, decline of food production, and economic misery” caused by the
expeditions to Mexico (Suchlicki, 1997, 21, 27-28), Spain maintained control over Cuba for
naval strategy; “Havana had become the most widely utilized port for the repair of vessels in
the Antilles, and one of the most widely utilized ports of call in its empire” (Cuban Economic
Research Project, 1975, 1). During the naval period the Cuban economy was based on repairing and building ships, while the agricultural potential of the island was neglected (Ritter,
1974, 10).
Although sugar production was favored in 1529 by a royal decree, which protects
sugar producers from foreclosure debt, sugar cultivation in Cuba presented slow growth compared to Jamaica, Haiti, or Barbados. This was caused by the following main reasons: lack of
foreign capital; lack of promotion from abroad; difficulties in importing equipment; costliness
of slaves’ imports, and lack of a rapidly growing market for sugar in Spain. Consequently,
Cuba truly developed its agricultural capabilities by the 1750s when the production of tobacco
was suited as the dominant Cuban export, and the word Havana was a synonym for quality
cigar tobacco in much of Europe (Ritter, 1972, 10-11). However, it was not until the generation from 1834 to 1867 that Cuba became an important colony for Spain, when the sugar industry proved to be remarkably profitable, and made Cuba “the richest colony in the world”
during that period (Alvarez, 2004, 5).
The Spanish colonization has four significant characteristics that explain why the
island did not experience a prompt economic development, i.e. late abolition of slavery, weak
labour legislation, high-cost of livelihood and great dependency on imports. ”On October 7,
1886 the Spanish government abolished slavery on the island”; twenty-one years after the
United States –on December 18, 1865 slavery was eradicated in the American nation (Simons,
1996, 122, 127).
It is important to state that “the slave labour was the factor that contributed most to
the delay in the development of a labour movement as such” in Cuba. Sociedad Económica
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de Amigos del País” (1793); “Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos de Honrados Artesanos y Jornaleros” (1857); “Asociación de Tabaqueros de la Habana” (1866) are the first labour organisations in the history of the colony, which were founded by Spanish workers who were concerned about the protection of their personal interests, but not engrossed in requesting to the Spanish crown the creation of a whole labour system to protect the entire Cuban labour population. After the conlusion of the Spanish power the labour legislation platform in Cuba was
restricted by natural conceptions protected by Civil, Commercial, and Penal Codes. “The labour contract was accomplished by the mere consent of the parties and the only requirement
was the term of the contract could not be set for lifetime”, according to the Civil Code, which
also stated that “in cases of death or bankruptcy of the employer, his employees enjoyed the
status of preferential creditors in the collection of their salaries and wages”. The Commercial
Code established an “indemnity of one month of salary when the discharge affected commercial employees” and the Penal Code punished with one to six months in prison to anyone who
were involved in any endeavor to change or reduce either the wages or the conditions of employment. By the nineteenth century, the low-income worker class used to live in “Solares” or
“Casas de Vencindad”, i.e. large houses occupied by many families –one family per room
(Cuban Economic Research Project, 1975, 22-27). The cost of livelihood at that time was considerably expensive.
“The cost of these rooms at the end of the century was $5.00 per month, on
the average, and in solares with better conditions, up to $14.00. The rest of
small houses in modest neighborhoods in Havana were about $20.00. The
supply of water by means of aqueducts was available to only 16 percent of
the dwellings on the island” (Cuban Economic Research Project, 1975, 27).
Mostly all the goods in Cuba were imported; “tools, paper, and even food-stuff were brought
in from the outside”. Spain built a mercantilist economy, strengthening Cuba’s dependence on
imports and “looking at the island as a producer of raw materials to satisfy the needs of the
mother country” (Suchlicki, 1997, 27).
After independence Cuba did not have established a strong labour organisation system, an efficient commercial law, or a competitive industrial sector, and most of the people
could not afford a decent livelihood. This particular situation of Cuba was not due to its previous condition of traditional society.
“One whose structure is developed within limited production functions,
based on pre-Newtonian science and technology, and on pre-Newtonian
attitudes towards the physical world. Newton is here used as a symbol for
that watershed in history when men came widely to believe that the external
world was subject to a few knowable laws, and was systematically capable
of productive manipulation.” The Five Stages of Growth by W.W. Rostow
(Kanth, 1994, 99).
But due to the own experience of Spain as a nation that has suffered from war and
economic strives. “In 1486, when Columbus first presented himself at the court, the Crown
was poor, heavily engaged in the last stage of the Reconquista” (Simons, 1996, 76). Therefore,
Spain was not interested in building economic autonomous colonies in America –they were
geographically located far away from Europe, and the Spanish empire was consolidating its
political power and assuring the increment of its economic resources; with the “Moors expelled from most of the Iberian Peninsula and the unity of Spain achieved, the Catholic monarchs now looked to new horizons to expand their faith as well as their commercial interests” (Suchlicki, 1997, 14).
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As a result, Cuba was merely considered as a provider of resources. The Spanish did
not plan to make the island an extension of their kingdom; consequently, they did not transfer
enough capital, knowledge or technology to improve the Cuban economy. Therefore, colonialism in Cuba generated the roots of a nation that would not find the guidance for a national
economic prospective by itself, and sixty-two years after its independence Cuba would remain
being a slave of its colonial history. “A socialist regime is here, but the fault is not ours, the
blame belongs to Columbus, the Spanish colonizers” (Fidel Castro, 1961, May Day Celebration: Cuba is a Socialist Nation Speech).
Tourism in Cuba before Fidel Castro: The Golden Years
“No country can be politically and economically independent, even within
the framework of international interdependence, unless it is highly industrialized and has developed its power resources to the utmost.”
- Jawaharlal Nehru
In the pre-Revolutionary era, the Cuban economy was characterized as being empowered by the new dominant nation in the hemisphere—the United States. In the nineteenth
century, when Spain was losing power among its colonies in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Cuban economy was acquired by American firms, which maintained ownership and
control until the Revolution (Thompson, 1997, 97).
Nevertheless, the origin of the American imperialism in Cuba goes back to the time
when the island was pursuing its recognition as an independent republic. Despite the ten-year
war (1868-1878) Cuba did not get its independence from Spain. There was an uncertain period before Cuba could be a liberated country. “On January 1, 1899, after the evacuation of the
Spanish troops”, the United States became the new power nation in Cuba; placing a military
government in the island until May 20, 1902; when Cuba proclaimed itself as an independent
republic (Cuban Economic Research Project, 1975, 3-4).
This was the first American intervention in Cuba, and with it a political legacy came
to being and controlled the state for more than thirty years, i.e. the Platt Amendment, “which
until 1934 had been forced into the Cuban constitution in 1901 by the United States.” The
purpose was to intervene Cuba as many times as it was necessary in order to protect “life,
property, and individual liberty” in the new nation (Boorstein, 1968, 9). The Platt Amendment
gave the United States a significant influence in Cuban politics, and consequently strengthened the confidence of American entrepreneurs to increase their investments in Cuba
(Alvarez, 2004, 4,6). Therefore, the Cuban economy was dominated by American monopolies
(Boorstein, 1968, 1).
The “Golden Age” of Cuban tourism (1952-1958) was during the government of
Fulgencio Batista –a military dictator. His administration can be described as what Kohli defines cohesive-capitalist state::
characterized by the top leadership equating rapid economic growth with
national security, a highly centralized and penetrating public authority, state
-controlled political society (though in close alliance with capitalist groups),
and a highly interventionist state, with a good quality economic bureaucracy. (2004, 12)
Batista was known for his authoritarian regime, and for holding negotiations with
American entrepreneurs, who enjoyed special treatment, i.e. having their interests considered
as superior to those of the local workers. This was possible because at the time, Cuba did not
possess competitive labor organisations—condition inhered from colonialism; therefore, it
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was impossible for Cuban workers be part of the economic development and implementation of planning (MacEwan, 1981, 128).
Although this situation promoted inequality within the Cuban society, the tourism
industry represented a worthwhile sector. The American entrepreneurs were preparing Cuba
for the anticipated Caribbean tourism boom of the 1960s, in which this nation would play a
central role (Baklanoff, 1998, 272).
The investment strategy taken by the Americans was to double the existing hotel
capacity in Cuba during 1952-1958. Foreign tourist expenditures increased from $19 million
in 1952 to an annual average of $60 million in 1957-1958. The hotels The Habana Hilton,
The Capri, The Habana Riviera, and The Nacional (all backed by U.S. owners) were very
important in promoting Cuba internationally as a first class service provider (Baklanoff,
1998, 266).
Transculturation was one of the foremost factors supporting the improvement of Cuban tourism.
Transculturation is a term “coined by the Cuban anthropologist Fernando
Ortiz in the early 1940s, and was created in order to explore the cultural
dynamics in operation between Cuba and the metropolitan centres.” With
the concept, Ortiz suggests, “a process of mutual interaction exists between cultures, despite the unequal distribution of power characteristic of
transcultural relations” (Herrle and Wegerhoff, 2008, 251-252).
The Americans not only traveled to Cuba for regular vacation, they also adopted
some aspects from the Cuban culture, making the voyage to the Caribbean island an endless
paradisiac experience, not to mention the promotion to visit the exotic country headed person-to-person by the Americans (Khrushchev, Henthorne, and Latour, 2007, 404).
Tourism became the major source of revenue (U.S. dollars) and employment during the
government of Batista. In 1957, the tourism sector produced more revenue than the tobacco
industry, and was second only to sugar production in profits (Falcoff, 2003, 132-133).
Nevertheless, in 1958 the vulnerable political environment rose by the struggles
between the rebel army (led by Fidel Castro) and President Batista interrupted the glorious
period of Cuban tourism. Once again, the Cuban economy became a slave of its own history.
Economic development is not a process that occurs by itself, it is the result of an
effective relationship between the government and the private sector. “State intervention
aimed at boosting investor profitability is strongly associated with rapid industrialization” (Kohli, 2004, 7). Therefore, a country cannot evolve economically without political
improvement. Moreover, there are four additional elements that determine the economic
performance of any country: luck, geographical location, institutions, and culture and social
capital (Lin, 9, 2009).
In the specific case of Cuba, the island was not lucky being colonized by Spain,
which compared to Portugal or England, was less industrialized. Besides the Spanish empire
did not consider the island as a prominent society.
The geographical location of Cuba allowed it to be taken into consideration first by the
Spanish for naval purposes, and later by the United States as a potential colony, or at least as
a lucrative market.
The Cuban institutions were based on personalized, corrupt bureaucracy, and the
Cuban culture was the result of a combination of Spanish and African influence, creating a
heterogeneous population.
Even though these factors have the capability to determine the development of a
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society, the role of the state, as Kohli states, can accelerate or impede economic growth. In
the Cuban context, it is easy to understand why the Cuban tourism sector improved so rapidly during the Batista period, and why it declined quickly after Fidel Castro came to power.
Cohesive-capitalist states have “proved to be the most successful agents of deliberate stateled industrialization in peripheral countries” (Kohli, 2004, 11).
Figure 1: Tourist Arrivals in Cuba, 1952-1959

Source: Sergei Khrushchev, Tony L. Henthorne and Michael S.
Latour, Cuba at the Crossroads: The Role of the U.S. Hospitality Industry in Cuban Tourism Initiatives; Cornell Hotel and
Restaurant Administration Quarterly 2007 48: 406.

In 1958 Cuba
faced a Revolution
against the government of Batista.
The country was
divided into two
groups, both with
contradictory political
ideologies.
Cuba was not longer the exotic island
of the Caribbean. It
was a dangerous
war zone until the
culmination of the
Revolution.

The genesis of the Cuban Revolution was the affiliation of the President Fulgencio
Batista with some members of the Mafia, e.g. Meyer Lansky, Lucky Luciano, and Santo
Trafficante Jr. who were well-know for being part of the organized crime in the United
States. “Lansky was paying Batista millions of dollars a year from mafia casinos in Cuba in
return for a monopoly of the business” (Simons, 1996, 259). The construction of the hotel
Riviera, for instance, was funded by Meyer Lansky and partially sponsored by the Cuban
government with fourteen millions of dollars, money that could be used to improve the life
of many Cuban citizens who lived in extreme poverty, especially in the countryside (History
Channel, Declassified: The Godfathers of Havana (Documentary) March 23, 2006). During
the dictatorship of Batista, “the Mafia funds airline companies to export cocaine” (Cuban
National Archives; Records of the Cuban National Bank, file 192, number 6). At the end of
1959, the number of tourists in Cuba fell to approximately 175,000 (Khrushchev,
Henthorne,
Cuban Tourism after the Revolution: A Generation of Isolation
“Understanding the Revolution is more difficult than
dying for the Revolution”
- Fidel Castro
On January 1, 1959, Cuba welcomed a new year and a new president—Fidel Castro.
The victorious Revolutionary party replaced the past government of Batista. It was a perfect
scenario to build a democratic and prosperous country. The new leader promised to work
for the Cubans and with the Cubans. The former revolutionaries received international sympathy, and the world welcomed the re-born Cuban nation. Nonetheless, the sympathy for the
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Revolution, especially from the United States, would rapidly end, when the younger halfbrother of Fidel—Raul Castro, and his colleague Che Guevara solidified their affiliation
with the Communist Soviet government (Khrushchev, Henthorne, and Latour, 2007, 405).
The foundation of the first communist country in the capitalist Caribbean found its
roots in a special visit from the Soviet Union. On February 4, 1960 the Soviet representative Anastas Mikoyan arrived at Cuba and signed a contract with Castro, which was worth
$100 million (US Dollars). The agreement was that the Soviet Union would buy 5 million
tons of sugar within three years, and in exchange Cuba would receive petroleum
(Khrushchev, Henthorne, and Latour, 2007, 405). Consequently, Cuba began a close relationship with the Communist Soviet government, and abnegated its commercial privileges
with the United States.
On May 1, 1960 a new era began for the Cuban society. The nation embraced
communism as its new political power. Fidel Castro was rigidly determined to maintain
his Marxist-Leninist ideology. He made it very clear for the Cuban citizens during the
May Celebration, but also for the international community, especially for the United
States, when he emphatically stated: “If Mr. Kennedy does not like socialism, well we do
not like imperialism! We do not like capitalism!”
The fact that Cuba had officially declared itself a communist country has two repercussions, i.e. the Cuban ”government is intent on not returning to the past, where as a
dependent capitalist country, it was subjected to external domination” (Saney 2004, 204205), and the United States felt threatened by the possibility of a military attack from Cuba. By this time there was increasing political tension between the United States and the
Soviet Union, and the “Cold War” period was well under way. Consequently, in April
1961 the United States President John F. Kennedy attempted unsuccessfully to invade
Cuba and topple the government of Castro. In July 1963, the United States invoked a commercial block against Cuba (Khrushchev, Henthorne, and Latour, 2007, 406).
I believe there is not country in the world… where economic colonization, exploitation, and humiliation were worse than in Cuba, in part owing to my country’s policies during the Batista regime. I can assure you
that I have understood the Cubans, I approved of the proclamation,
which Fidel Castro made in the Sierra Maestra, when he justifiably
called for justice and especially yearned to rid Cuba of corruption. In the
matter of Batista regime, I am in agreement with the first Cubans revolutionaries. That is perfect clear. But it is also clear that the problem has
ceased to be a Cuban one and has become international, that is, it has
become a Soviet problem. I am the President of the United States and
not socialist; I am the President of a free nation which has certain responsibilities to the free world. I know that Castro betrayed the promises made in the Sierra Maestra, and that he has agreed to be a Soviet
agent in Latin America” (The United States President John. F. Kennedy
during an interview by Jean Daniel, which was published on December
14, 1963 in the New Republic, pp. 15-20).
After the embargo of the United States, the tourism sector in Cuba decreased in a surprising manner. In the mid-1960s Cuba was receiving a miniscule three thousand foreign tourists per year (Khrushchev, Henthorne, and Latour, 2007, 406).
There is no reliable data about the performance of the Cuban tourism in the
1960s. Even so, it is reasonable to expect a significant decrease in state revenues from the
tourism sector. During the first years of the Castro administration, tourism was not considered a lucrative business, but a racism engine. Therefore, it is not surprising that during the
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Fidel Castro regime the industry of tourism lost its importance as economic sector, as it used
to be during the Batista period. However, Cuban tourism was not neglected by the state for
hedonism or simple obstinacy. The lack of direct state involvement in tourism has its origin in
the racial conflict that the Cubans (especially those who descended from Africans) faced during the pre-Revolution government. Saney points out the perception of the Cubans toward
tourism, according to Shakur:
…racist ideas and racist attitudes about the natives… People come down
here with big money, with big money attitudes, and no respect for the people, no respect for the Revolution… So tourism industry makes a kind of
attitude that does not do anything but reinforce white supremacist values,
mentality, and power relations. You don’t see a lot of black tourists come
into Cuba. It’s economic, so that power is associated with white people.
(2004, 110)
The Revolution was the social rights agent for the black Cubans and for the first time
since the colonial stage they considered themselves as Cuban citizens, with the capability to
be active performers in national subjects. Saney presents Nicolas Guillén, an Afro-Cuban, and
national poet, whose poem “Tengo” (I Have) summed up the significance of the Revolution
for blacks in 1967 (2004, 102):
I have, let’s see:
that being black
I can be stopped by no one at
the door of a dancing hall or bar.
I have, let’s see:
that I have learned to read,
To count
I have that I have learned to write,
and to think
and to laugh.
I have that now I have
a place to work
and earn
What I have to eat.
I have let’s see:
I have what was coming to me.
The social improvement led by the Revolutionary government of Fidel Castro should be admired by all the nations around the world, as well as by social development scholars. According to the United Nations Development Programme, Cuba is the country number 51 in human
development in the world (Human Development Report, 2011, 126).
Nevertheless, economic development is decisive in regards to increasing the quality
of the popular welfare. MacEwan points out that many economic theorists, particularly neoclassicists, consider the Marxist-Leninist system in Cuba to be a suitable illustration to prove
that is not possible to incorporate economic growth and economic equality, not in contemporary times, and not in a global market economy. He states that the social policies of Castro
were not effective for the Cuban economy:
The problem faced by Cuba, and by other nations attempting to build socialism in the context of capitalist underdevelopment, has been how to accomplish the task of both transforming the productive forces of society and
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transforming social relations. (1981, 127)
The economic future of Cuba based on its Marxist-Leninist ideology is unpredictable, but
the social needs of Cubans are still heard by the state.
The Embargo of the United States on Cuba: An Economic Perspective
“Cuba does not intend to be a pawn on the global chessboard”
- Fidel Castro
Not only political subjects caused the embargo of the United States –the Cold War,
but also economic matters did so. After the Revolution, the Cuban government confiscated
–without any compensation –all the properties owned by the Americans; and doing that the
Cuban authorities infringed the international commerce law. Therefore, the embargo of the
United States was not only pursuing its political policy, i.e. force Fidel Castro to change its
totalitarian government and hold democratic elections, but now an economic purpose was
established –reintroduce a market economy in Cuba. “With a clear perception of anticipated
consequences, Castro resolutely engaged in an extremely risky course of action, one that
eventually would lead to a complete change in the character of the Cuban society and economy by creating an aberrant dependence on the Soviet bloc.” The United States has historically constituted a natural and complementary commercial partner for Cuba, being its principal provider of trade relations, financial assistance, direct investment, and technology
transfer. (Horowitz and Suchlicki, 2001, 263-265). In economic matters, when Fidel Castro
chose communism, he excluded the opportunity for Cuba to reinvent itself and develop its
economic capabilities.
Cuban Government Reform: The Return of Tourism
“All openings have brought risks. If we must make additional openings
and reforms, we will. But for the moment they are not necessary”
- Fidel Castro
The importance of tourism as an economic sector was reestablished in Cuba before the fall of the Soviet Union. In the mid-1970s Cuba was receiving a great majority of
its visitors from countries friendly with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it was in the 1990s
when the government of Cuba recognized tourism as a prominent economic sector
(Horowitz and Suchlicki, 2001, 407-08). Therefore, the new “boom” of the Cuban tourism
was after the Castro administration implemented its reforms during the mid-1990s.
It is important to point out that these reforms were not political policies, and even though
Fidel Castro applied some opening strategies to the economy, Cuba would remain a communist state.
“Several measures have been implemented in the past few months…
Does this mean that we should abandon our socialist principles or our
Marxist-Leninist convictions? On the contrary, we should to conduct
ourselves as genuine Marxists-Leninists… At any rate, this does not imply… that this is a return to capitalism, or much worse, an insane and
hysterical race in that direction” (Fidel Castro, July 26, 1995).
In the tourism sector, four innovative economic policies were taken, i.e. the Cuban
government amended its constitution in 1992 to recognize and protect private property, in
1993 the Cuban government permitted the dollar to circulate legally for the first time since
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1959, the Decree-Law 147 in 1994 created a new Ministry of Tourism, and the Cuban tourist agency (INTUR) and Cubanacán were broken up into a number of separate entities to
render the state sector more agile (Falcoff, 2003, 136).
Figure 2:Tourist Arrivals in
Cuba, 1974-1979
After these policies took place
in Cuba, the tourism sector
underwent great improvement.
In 1979 the tourist arrivals in
Cuba was close to 140,000. In
2005 this number was close to
2,500,000, presenting a huge
increase of 17.85 times
17. 85 times more than in
1979.

Source: Sergei Khrushchev, Tony L. Henthorne and Michael S.
Latour, Cuba at the Crossroads: The Role of the U.S. Hospitality
Industry in Cuban Tourism Initiatives; Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 2007 48: 407.

“In the past decade, Cuba has
experienced the highest rate of growth in tourism arrivals to become the overall second most
popular tourism destination in the Caribbean region and the second most popular regional
destination for European travelers” (Horowitz and Suchlicki, 2001, 409).
The development theory of Kohli and its emphasis about the role of the state in
economic growth becomes stronger through the Cuban case. The tourism sector in Cuba
developed enormously after many years of stagnant growth. However, growth was possible
when the government of Cuba realized that in order to improve the economy it should open
its market to foreign direct investment.

Source: Sergei Khrushchev, Tony L. Henthorne and Michael S. Latour, Cuba at the Crossroads: The Role of the
U.S. Hospitality Industry in Cuban Tourism Initiatives;
Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly
2007 48: 409.

Figure 3: Tourist Arrivals in
Cuba, 1996-2005
The Cuban tourism sector remained remarkable during the
four following years. In 2006
Cuba received a total of
2,150,000 tourists. In 2007
2,119,000 tourists visited the
Caribbean island, in 2008 it increased to 2,316,00 and the
he next year Cuba received
2,405,000 tourists (World Development Indicators & Global
Development Finance, The
World Bank, 15 December,
2010).

In comparison to 2006, the number of tourist arrivals in 2007 decreased by 31,000
tourists. Though, next year that number would increase by 197,000. In 2009 the number of
tourist arrivals presented a growth of 1.04%.
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Figure 4: Tourist Arrivals in Cuba, 2006-2009
On the one hand, despite the accelerated
growth of the Cuban tourism sector in the last
years; the government of Cuba still has central
control of the economy. The hospitality industry is
struggling with the limitations imposed by the state
due to the uncertainty about the Cuban government’s commitment to foreign direct investment,
the government’s constraints on the operation of
business, enterprises’ prohibition from managing
human resources, the inability to pay workers in
convertible currency and the United States sanctions (Ritter, 2004, 155-166).
On the other hand, Cuba has demonstrated that in case of open entirely its economy to free
Source: World Development Indicators & Globmarket it would improve the tourism sector at great
al Development Finance, The World Bank,
scale. In 2005, Cuba was the second most visited
15 December, 2010.
island in the Caribbean, with 2,319,300 tourists,
after the Dominican Republic’s 3,690,700 tourists
(Horowitz and Suchlicki, 2001, 410).
Table 1: Comparative Caribbean Tourism Data

Source: Sergei Khrushchev, Tony L. Henthorne and Michael S. Latour, Cuba at the
Crossroads: The Role of the U.S. Hospitality Industry in Cuban Tourism Initiatives;
Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 2007 48: 410.
Figure 5: International tourism, receipts (USD)
In 1995 the annual tourism revenues
in Cuba increased to $1 billion (USD). At the
end of 2005, it topped the $2 billion (USD)
mark (Horowitz and Suchlicki, 2001, 410).
Although this provides proof of economic
success in the tourism sector, the Cuban economy remains in the shadow of a communist
society, which does not allow a private sector
to develop, and in which the state determines
how the national market should function and
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how negotiations should be held. “As long as the［economic］system doesn’t change, and
private enterprise is forced to operate with so many controls, the Cubans will not really prosper” (Falcoff, 2003 138). Many of the Castro’s government policies fit perfectly in the dependency theory of Andre Gunder Frank, where developing countries retain their markets isolated from developed economies. Unfortunately, contemporary economy is based on close
cooperation with the private sector, foreign investment, knowledge and technology transfer,
international relations, and global market.
Concluding Observations
The colonial stage in Cuba constituted the foundation of a slow-growing economy,
limited in most of the cases by a lack of foreign investment and technology transfer. The history of Cuba is clear evidence of the importance of colonization in economic development. For
Cuba, the Spanish colonization meant to be the beginning of a society economically and politically dependent on foreign nations.
During the Batista regime Cuba revealed considerable economic growth, and was one
of the principal commercial partners of the United States. The golden era of Cuban tourism
was between 1952-1957—still under Batista administration. Most of the tourists were Americans, and the major investor in the tourism industry was indeed the United States. The improvement of the tourism sector in Cuba at that time was possible because of the cohesivecapitalist government of Batista.
After the Revolution, the Cuban economy changed drastically, moving from a capitalist system to a communist structure. The end of the commercial liaison between Cuba and
the United States defined the start of an isolated generation, where tourism was one the most
afflicted economic sectors. The tourist clientele during the Soviet period was only from Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union did not invest in the tourism industry as much as the United
States did during the Batista dictatorship.
The tourism sector could lead the Cuban economy to development because it has
been the principal source of employment and foreign exchange earnings for the last fifteen
years. The tourism industry is the primary force behind foreign direct investment in Cuba. In
the last two decades, the service industrial has become the main economic resource for Caribbean countries as a whole, and Cuba has a strategic geographical location that makes the island a very attractive choice for the tourists.
The economic policies taken by the Cuban government alienated tourism from development for more than thirty years. The lack of foreign direct investment and a market economy made it difficult to improve this vital sector. Since the communist government took power,
the state has been in complete control of the economy. The Castro administration did not consider tourism as an important economic sector. As a result this industry fell into a critical period where the state did not invest in the sector.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba was economically unsponsored, and
lacked a developed industry sector. Therefore, tourism seemed to be the best solution to face
its economic crisis. The Cuban government had to make some reforms in order to offer an
attractive and profitable environment for foreign investors. Even though the economic policies
taken by Cuba allowed foreign direct investment, the tourism sector presented some limitations.
Cuba has a totalitarian economy, hence the state dictates the regulations about how
investments in the market should operate, and it is the only mediator for all commercial negotiations. Cuba does not have a free market; therefore, the embargo of the United States is not
the major cause of the limited performance of tourism in Cuba. It is clear that once Castro
permitted the entry of foreign capital, the tourism sector showed a substantial improvement.
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Then a question arises: can Cuba achieve economic development without making political
reforms? It seems that the future of the tourism sector, as in the rest of the Cuban economy,
must rely on a market economy, but the Marxist-Leninist ideologies of Fidel Castro are based
on a centrally controlled economy. Cuba, originally named by Spanish colonizers as “the place
of safety,” is not currently a safe place for economic development. The Cuban policies are
essentially oriented to protect the interests of the state, which do not allow the private sector to
flow completely free and naturally. If Cuba wants to become an economic successful nation, it
has to wake up from its communist dream and embrace a capitalist reality.
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UNION INITIATED OBSTACLES THAT LIMIT DISCRETIONARY POWER OF MID-LEVEL MANAGERS OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
By Daniel Daugherty
School of Public Affairs and Administration
daniel.daugherty@wmich.edu
The purpose of this paper is to identify and examine union initiated obstacles that
Social Security Administration (SSA) mid-level managers face in using discretionary power.
Managers should be aware of the bounds in which they operate in order to adequately negotiate decisions, which ultimately seek to serve public needs and promote workplace democracy.
In examining the limitations of discretionary power I emphasize the importance of contractual
restrictions by focusing on the elements of collective bargaining and grievance resolution. The
intent of contractual obligations is to promote participative leadership and equality. However
when management is stripped of certain discretionary powers strong disincentives result, encouraging laissez-faire leadership. Awareness of hurtles that contractual restrictions and corresponding historic adjudicative actions will enable managers to alter their leadership style and
approach, while resisting the temptation to resort to laissez-faire leadership.
Leadership
The definition of leadership is debatable among practitioners and scholars, and managers and the managed. Bass indicates that that the search for one true meaning of leadership
is fruitless (2008). Rather, the definition stems from the interpretation of the observer in the
context of the situation (Bass, 2008). Regardless of one’s perspective of leadership, few would
argue that discretionary powers are an unnecessary element of leadership.
Managerial Discretion
Mid-level managers of the SSA who interact directly with front-line workers exercise
discretion when they experience, think, judge, and then act (Arendt, 2003) (Weber, 1946).
These managers must have discretionary limits to avoid possible abuses of the system, such as
failing to adhere to the letter and intent of the law (Hibbeln and Shumavon, 1986), exercising
arbitrariness, or allowing and/or promoting inequality (Davis, 1969). Conversely, managers
must be allowed the flexibility to properly implement policies in an engrossed world of language confliction and political, supervisorial, peer, public, and employee pressure (Hibbeln
and Shumavon, 1986). Certainly a reasonable balance must be sought between absolute discretionary power and rules that enforce discretionary limitations.
In his 1969 book, administrative law scholar Kenneth Davis indicated that discretionary power should be monitored and controlled through administrative and judicial measures
(1969). It is the administrators themselves, involved with the details of vague legislative policies, who should make the rules governing administrative procedures (Davis, 1969). The act
of distributing this power to front-line workers is certainly instrumental in that workers are
given a sense of ownership (Bass, 2008).
Similar to managers, front-line workers need appropriate levels of discretion in order
to effectively complete tasks and successfully develop leadership skills (Lipsky, 1980). The
manager must empower employees with the necessary tools that will enable them to meet
management goals, while preserving agency quality, service, and excellence (Bass, 2008).
There is a balance that must be met between management and employee discretion. By allowThe Hilltop Review, Fall 2011
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ing greater employee discretion the manager must freely, or through coercion, relinquish discretionary power. This loss of power often results in a reduction in the manager’s sense of
achievement and recognition (Bass, 2008).
SSA Manager Discretion
As with most large public organizations, the SSA has policies which have evolved
toward more narrowed definitions and implementations, reductions in discretionary powers of
managers and workers, and subjugations of management and workers toward more defined
bounds in which they must work (Social Security Administration, 2011). Front-line worker
membership in the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), the primary unionized representative body of voluntary non-management SSA personnel, has historically
been instrumental in securing decision making power, resolving passed losses of employee
discretionary power. Unfortunately, in this swing of the pendulum, mid-level management has
experienced further limitations to discretionary power to the extent that the overarching views
of both management and employees are a mere semblance of previously existent leadership .
And while the manager’s further development of personal leadership skills has declined, the
importance on a narrowed focus of technocratic skills and parallel leadership has increased
significantly. As a result, managers possessing poor negotiation skills with their union representative counterparts often resort to laissez-faire leadership, becoming managers who “bury
themselves in paperwork and stay away from employees” (Bass, 2008).
AFGE/SSA Contractual Overview
Union representatives that managers must negotiate with are represented by the AFGE. The AFGE is comprised of 600,000 federal and D.C. government workers, with only 15%
of these workers located in the D.C. area, and 1,100 Locals represented primarily by employees of the Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Social Security
Administration (2011). A contract between the AFGE and the SSA stipulates the bounds in
which management conduct activities (SSA and AFGE, 2005). Similar to the German system
of unionization, managers are not members of the union (Dewitt, 1980) (SSA and AFGE,
2005). This is due to the fear that possible erosion of worker bargaining authority might ensue
(Dewitt, 1980). Among many contractual obligations that management must adhere to, collective bargaining and grievance settlement are mid-level manager’s top priorities in the decision
making process.
Collective bargaining has the advantage of promoting participative, rather than directive, leadership. In the 1920s the industrial union’s collective bargaining agreement started
to be used in conjunction with Frederick Taylor’s scientific management principles (Fry,
1998). Applying Taylor’s framework, ideally decisions which involve employee fairness and
equality would be decided collectively between the representative union member and the SSA
manager without compromising agency efficiency or effectiveness. In practice Taylor’s principles take a back seat to union interests. Although Taylor’s principles may seem a bit antiquated today, the basic premise of the search for maximum productivity still remains essential in
the private and public sectors. Union interests, however, do not seek productive efficiencies.
Rather, they seek increased member involvement and bargaining leverage. Since unions only
seek contraction, agendas that attempt to scale back union power or member base meet fierce
union opposition.
In terms of AFGE members, the AFGE does accomplish the primary mission, “to
improve the professional and personal lives of …members and to improve government services” (AFGE, 2006). This accomplishment is not without costs. The Federal Times reported
in June of 2011 that a ban of official union activities during working hours was being sought
by republicans due to an Office of Personnel Management report that indicated an estimated
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$129 million was spent for 3 million hours of union activities in 2009 (Losey, 2011). The unavailability of workers due to union activities limits resources available to mid-level managers
at a time when budget reductions due to the looming recession are ever present. Managers
cannot achieve optimal performance through their staff if they do not have the ability to exert
control over others through available resources (Henderson and Martin, 2001).
Backing union officials’ defense of SSA expenditures for union activities was Democratic Representative Stephen Lynch (Losey, 2011). He indicated that this time is spent toward
“resolving workplace disputes, improving workplace safety and other working conditions,
enforcing protections against discrimination, negotiating telework agreements, or creating fair
promotion procedures” (Losey, 2011). The AFGE president, John Gage, furthered the agreement by suggesting that “eliminating official time would effectively spell the end of collective
bargaining in the federal government” (Losey, 2011). This “all or nothing” approach is fairly
common in negotiation procedures, yet is still an effective scare tactic. The result of a failure
to change is a forced limitation on the ability for mid-level managers to use manpower towards their goals, thus suppressing the element of action in exercising discretion (Arendt,
2003) (Weber, 1946).
Contract Analysis
Developing mid-level manager’s leadership growth requires giving them the necessary resources that allow discretionary power (Maxwell, 1993). By discouraging personal
growth mid-level managers are demotivated from achieving valid successes (Maxwell, 1993).
In examining discretion of mid-level managers the Management Rights section of the most
recent binding contract between the SSA and AFGE must be observed (SSA and AFGE,
2005):
Section 1. Statutory Rights
A.
Subject to subsection (B) of this section, nothing in this Agreement shall affect the
authority of any management official of any agency-1.
to determine the mission, budget, organization, number of employees and
internal security practices of the agency; and
2.
in accordance with applicable laws-a.
to hire, assign, direct, layoff and retain employees in the
agency or to suspend, remove, reduce in grade or pay, or take other disciplinary action against such employees;
b.
to assign work, to make determinations with respect to
contracting out, and to determine the personnel by which agency operations
shall be conducted;
c.
with respect to filling positions, to make selections for
appointments from(1) among properly ranked and certified candidates for promotion;
or
(2) any other appropriate source; and
d.
to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the
agency mission during
emergencies.
B.
Nothing in this section shall preclude any agency and any labor organization from
negotiating-1.
at the election of the agency, on the numbers, types and grades of employees
or positions assigned to any organizational subdivision, work project, or tour
of duty, or on the technology, methods and means of performing work;
2.
procedures which management officials of the agency will observe in exercising any authority under this section; or
The Hilltop Review, Fall 2011

81

Daniel Daugherty
3.

appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the exercise
of any authority under this section by such management officials.

SSA managers represent the most trusted senior workers who generally begin their career as
front-line workers. Yet, they are not able to exercise their wisdom without the filter of the representatives of their subordinates. This often subjects them to be categorized as the glorified
mentor and the gatekeeper of hierarchical information. Their supervisors are in turn limited to
evaluating performance of procedural metrics, including union grievances. The manager is
forced to shift from the public preference of a customer centric organization to a customer
centric organization bound by competing union membership agendas. Collectively bounds are
incrementally narrowed through adjudicative victories and favorable legislative policy.
Through a more fragmented process union members ultimately affect policy through exploiting the contractual obligations of workplace grievance resolution.
The Union Grievance
The process of settling grievances with union assistance has advantages for both the
worker and the manager. The worker gets an opportunity to voice his disposition in cases
where the worker may feel intimidated or lack critical communication skills (Devonish and
Nurse, 2007). Grievance settlement also provides the employee with a method to solve contract violations without fear of repercussions (Devonish and Nurse, 2007). Workers also are
able to redirect management agendas and ensure that the workplace justice is equitable
(Devonish and Nurse, 2007). Management benefits from resolving disputes before work is
inhibited or ceased (Devonish and Nurse, 2007). This outcome allows for prevention of higher
turnover and the associated recruitment, selection and training costs (Devonish and Nurse,
2007).
Over involvement of union oversight can lead to negative outcomes of grievance
settlements and unnecessary suppression of management control. This limitation of discretionary power affords incompetent employees a barrier of protection under the umbrella of the
violated few. An AFGE attorney won a $100,000 award for punitive and compensatory damages for 14 year veteran Magnolia Littles in an arbitration case in June of 2010 (Erling, 2010).
After receiving a 90 day suspension for approving a fraudulent payment, Magnolia claimed
that other employees were involved who had not received suspension, and was therefore the
victim of discrimination (Erling, 2010).
Another case that resulted in an unfavorable decision involved claims representative
Uma Ashok who filed two separate actions involving claims of discrimination and harassment
due to national origin and religion (Ashok v. Barnhart, 2003). Her first claim was filed on November 19, 1992 after she discovered the words “Bloody Indian” scribed on her jacket (Ashok
v. Barnhart, 2003). Additional allegations resulted from Uma, eventually resulting in a final
court decision by the United States District Court for The Eastern District of New York on
October 30, 2003 (Ashok v. Barnhart, 2003).
The decisions and justifications of these cases are immaterial to the effect that they
have on management discretion. It is often the process itself that has the most drastic outcome
in changing management behavior. Both cases required increased expenditures by the federal
government and decreased productive management time allocations. Strictly on the basis of
preserving taxpayer dollars, one might conclude that the costs associated with legal proceedings outweigh the costs to reprimand or retain an incompetent employee.
These cases likely resulted in looming negative stigmas of the direct supervisors involved. A denial was the result of the second case, however, an 11 year period elapsed from
the time allegations were first made and the decision was granted by a U.S. district judge. This
is 11 years of possible promotions or appraisals leading to promotion in a competitive enviThe Hilltop Review, Fall 2011
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ronment in which minute differences are the basis for selection decisions. Obviously, any arbitration agreement accepted by a worker is a union victory at the expense of the manager’s upward mobility.
Managerial Response
Judicial review will affect relationship dynamics between front-line workers and
management. Since managers are often embedded in SSA organizational culture for 10 or
more years before reaching the first rung of the management ladder the tacit knowledge
gained by mid-level managers from witnessing the judicial decision making process is at a
fairly mature stage, so they tend to be well aware of and able to avoid potential pitfalls. Rooting in this knowledge is the incentive for mid-level managers to lay low, prevent friction, and
limit decisions to those that have union support. The manager may be incentivized to practice
passive management by exception, where “the leader intervenes only if agreements are not
kept or subordinates’ standards fall below standards” (Bass, 2008, p.143). When the manager
makes a conscience decision not to intervene in failed agreements and low standards laissezfaire leadership is taking place (Bass, 2008).
The cases presented and many others that have had similar results represent union
victories, inevitably resulting in further increases of employee power and union support. Like
any organization, resources are limited. Therefore, the swift victories are preferable, serving as
advertising campaigns for the AFGE. A blatant attempt to secure membership is presented in
the AFGE’s public release of Magnolia Little’s case in which attorney Patti McGowan boasts,
"This is a first for an SSA local in arbitration, the unprecedented sums of damages awarded to
our member should serve as a wake-up call. We won't let these blatant injustices to our members stand” (Erling, 2010). In addition to securing membership, these AFGE public releases
serve to shape the minds of the workers destine for the management track.
Agencies tend to be responsive to adjudicatory and arbitration findings by reevaluating and reformulating administrative values and procedures (Ludd, 1986). Max Weber contends that legitimate legal-rational authority is upheld by administrative procedures (Fry,
1998). Subordination to authority is then directed from an “impersonal order”, not the manager (Fry, 1998, p. 28). And “legal authority exists only when legal order is implemented and
obeyed in the belief that it is legitimate” (Fry, 1998, p. 29). When legality of authority is diminished by collective AFGE actions legitimacy of mid-level management decisions is similarly reduced.
Collective Bargaining
Mid-level management practices are also bound by the restrictions of collective bargaining in the the use of monetary incentives to motivate employees to act in the interest of
taxpayers. In October of 1988 the SSA piloted a budget/gain sharing program that divided
local budget savings, based the previous year’s productivity, evenly into both the Social Security Trust Fund and monetary awards to be distributed at the discretion of mid-level management (U.S. DHHS, SSA v. FLRA, AFGE). The AFGE responded by filing a grievance indicating that the national collective bargaining agreement had been violated, indicating the SSA
had failed to negotiate the implementation of the program (U.S. DHHS, SSA v. FLRA, AFGE). The decision reached by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was an allowance for management to retain the discretion to determine the budget (U.S. DHHS, SSA v.
FLRA, AFGE). However, the “procedures and appropriate arrangements” of budget allocations was ruled in favor of the AFGE (U.S. DHHS, SSA v. FLRA, AFGE, p. 1).
This case, among many, shapes management actions. According to Herbert Simon,
given a person’s limited capacities, the decision maker will respond to select stimuli, particularly shaped by routines, habits or routine or creative problem solving (Fry, 1998). Managers
use select “environmental stimuli” (Fry, 1998, p. 193) to exercise discretion when they experiThe Hilltop Review, Fall 2011

83

Daniel Daugherty

ence, think, judge, and then act (Arendt, 2003) (Weber, 1946). Discretion is therefore limited
when action is restricted by dominate stimuli. Only experiences, thoughts, and judgments
which support union interests will result in viable actions; therefore, to increase efficient patterns of thought, the mid-level manager must realize cognitive bounds. The result is management’s “routinized and habitual responses”, while the “creative search activity” is minimized
(Fry, 1998). In order to realize creative decision making SSA mid-level managers must successfully negotiate agendas in the arena of workplace democracy.
Variables of the Magnitude of Participation
Union initiated managerial bounds do spur the environment for workplace democracy
to flourish. The magnitude of participation in the decision making process of a democratic
workplace can be measured by examining five variables: extensity, scope, mode, intensity and
quality (Mason, 1982).
First, the extensity, the proportion and absolute number, of workers who participate
in decisions in the organization has increased as management restrictions have decreased
(Mason, 1982). Although many front-line workers are not members of the AFGE, membership
is not required to participate in the fruits that the AFGE and SSA contract binds management
actions to. However, if participation were minimal the threat of work stoppages would cease
to be a threat to the SSA; therefore, contract compliance would naturally have minimal impact
on management decisions.
Second, the scope, the number and type of issues, of decisions are decided collectively relative to the decentralized structure of the SSA (Mason, 1982). Technology has played an
instrumental role in allowing for more decision making capabilities to be made in a shorter
time. The frequency and number of issues in the SSA can be decided by means of email and
instant messages in a relatively short time. With limited available time not devoted to direct
front-line customer service, managers are able to maximize collective buy-in.
Neil Chamberlain, who was the associate professor of economics and assistant director of the Labor and Management Center at Yale University, indicates that the scope of collective bargaining is often framed to explain that the area in which management discretion is
most constricted is from the continually increasing power of the union (1951). He argued that
the resulting decision is a “joint product” between management and the union, rather than a
narrowing of management discretionary authority (Chamberlain, 1951, p.152). Yet, Chamberlain’s view stemmed from worker protection from “steel barons” and “coal kings” who subjected their workers to unsafe working conditions and low wages (1951, p. 156).
Third, the mode, the form of participation, often depends on the importance of the
decision being made (Mason, 1982). Face to face discussions continue to be the most acceptable forum to make decisions that may result in significant change and require input from all
members. Employees appreciate face to face decisions when news has a significant personal
effect and the availability of immediate feedback is necessary. Conversely, the electronic messaging is a useful tool for routine matters requiring no urgency.
Fourth, intensity, “the psychological involvement of individuals in the act of participation”, of the decision is instrumental as a deciding factor for the outcome (Mason, 1982,
p.155). Front-line workers who do not believe that a decision will result that makes a difference will often fail to adhere to the procedure being decided. Psychological involvement is
also dependent on the worker’s perceived fairness of the outcome (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001).
Distributive and procedural justices heavily influence intensity in the workers interpretation of fairness (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001). Distributive justice is dependent on
the workers perceived distribution of the quantity and quality of work (Cohen-Charash and
Spector, 2001). When a worker perceives work distribution to be unfair the worker experiences “anger, pride, or guild” (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001, p. 280). Procedural justice is
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a perception of the fairness of the process that results are derived (CSpector, 2001). Included
in procedural justice is the way employees view the mid-level manager’s process of communication (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001). Employees tend to perceived justified actions
when mid-level managers incorporate politeness, honesty, and respect in their messages
(Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001).
Finally, quality, the impact in the workplace, of the decision also has a high impact
on worker involvement (Mason, 1982). Participation in the decision and management buy-in
contributes to the quality of the decision and is more likely to result in worker compliance.
Decisions that often fail to be quality decisions are those that are hasty and formulated and
delivered by one person.
Taking these factors into account allows for mid-level managers to evaluate the extent that workplace democracy is transpiring within their realm of control, and to attempt to
suppress or promote further worker involvement in the democratic process. While there is not
an adequate means to measure these factors, other organizations can be used as a basis for
comparison. One could logically speculate that the intensity and longevity of union involvement in an organization positively correlates with workplace democracy and negatively correlates with mid-level management discretionary power.
Conclusion
Mid-level managers need to be aware of bounds of union contract agreements and
past adjudicative actions in order to function successfully as a leader. The manager also must
be aware of the bounds manifested in collective bargaining and the consequences of worker
grievances in order to successfully negotiate preferred outcomes and avoid the pitfall of laissez-faire leadership. Finally, managers should be aware of the benefits of workplace democracy and the elements needed to ensure compliance.
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